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OTHER PEOPLE’S PATRIOT ACTS:
EUROPE’S RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 11
Kim Lane Scheppele*

I. INTRODUCTION
September 11, 2001 was a shock not just to the United
States but to the world.
In the immediate aftermath of
September 11, expressions of solidarity and collective grief were
1
2
nearly universally expressed by world leaders. Both regional
3
and multilateral organizations indicated their willingness to act
with the United States in response to the attack. The United
Nations condemned the attacks and urgently called for

* Kim Lane Scheppele is the John J. O’Brien Professor of Comparative Law and
Professor of Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania. Previous versions of this
paper were given at the symposium on terrorism at the Association of American Law
Schools in Atlanta, Georgia and at the Institute for Legal Studies, University of
Wisconsin at Madison. The author would like to thank participants in these sessions
for helpful feedback. She would also like to thank Helen Hartnell for much
assistance in understanding EU law, Russell Miller for his wise counsel in matters of
German constitutional law and Serguei Oushakine for his perspective beyond law.
This paper was completed in mid-March 2004, so later events are not taken into
account in this analysis.
1. World Leaders Express Outrage, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 11, 2001, available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/september11/story/0,11209,600809,00.html (last visited
May 11, 2004).
2. For the reactions of regional organizations, see INTERNATIONAL BAR
ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 32-38 (2004) [hereinafter TASK
FORCE ON TERRORISM].
The European Union Council of Ministers had an
extraordinary session shortly after September 11 and expressed its solidarity and
cooperation with the United States. Press Release, European Council, Conclusions
and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting (Sept. 21, 2001),
available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/140.en.pdf.
3. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invoked the mutual defense
provision of the NATO charter under Article 5 by declaring that if this were a foreign
attack on the United States, then it would be considered an attack against all NATO
members. Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Statement by the
North
Atlantic
Council
(Sept.
12,
2001),
available
at
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm.
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international cooperation to bring justice to those responsible for
4
the atrocities. The attack was widely perceived as being not just
5
on the United States but on the “civilized world.” In those first
few days before America’s disbelief turned to intense national
patriotism, there was a widespread sense that, while the attack
may have been specifically directed against the United States, the
whole world felt the pain.
Since September 11, America’s own reaction has become
more inward-looking, unilateral, and self-absorbed. The rest of
the world, however, is still engaged by September 11 and its
continuing threats. In particular, America’s European allies,
though split over the justifiability of the attack by the United
States on Iraq in the spring of 2003, have by and large adopted a
posture supportive of and complementary to that of the United
States in the ongoing fight against terrorism. This Article
examines the developing legal framework of Europe’s response to
September 11, first by examining the international legal basis for
6
Europe’s actions, then the responses of the European Union (EU)
7
itself, followed by the legal reforms of two of the EU member
states who represent the most starkly opposed trajectories of
8
9
In closing there is an
reaction — Germany and Britain.
examination of the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights’ decisions on terrorism-related issues after
10
September 11, since it urges caution in the name of human
rights against overreacting to the terrorist threat. Though there
is a common sense that September 11 requires a strong response,
there is a great variation in the extent to which preserving
respect for human rights and civil liberties is considered an
equally important task.

4. G.A. Res. 1, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/56/PV1 (2001),
available
at
http://ods-ddsback-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/475/00/PDF/
N0147500.pdf?OpenElement.
5. Tony Blair started using this term shortly after September 11. Philip
Webster, We Will Not Stop, We Will Not Flinch, Blair Tells Assembly, TIMES OF
LONDON, Oct. 31, 2001, 2001 WL 29001014.
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See infra Part III.A.
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. See infra Part IV.
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1373
The international framework for national legal changes in
response to September 11 was given first and foremost by an
extraordinary resolution of the United Nations (UN) Security
Council, passed on September 28, 2001, while the wreckage of the
Twin Towers still smoldered a short distance away. In Resolution
11
1373, the Security Council required all states to take a wide
variety of measures to fight terrorism —including, among other
things, cutting off financing of terrorist acts, taking steps to
prevent terrorism, criminalizing participation in terrorist attacks,
refusing safe haven to terrorists, and preventing the state’s
12
territory from being used for terrorism.
Resolution 1373 also
called for increased international cooperation in fighting
terrorism, for more comprehensive sharing of information and for
13
intensified restrictions on the movement of terrorists.
Resolution 1373 was adopted under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter, since the Security Council determined that the
attacks of September 11 constituted “a threat to international
14
peace and security.” Under Chapter VII, the Security Council
may direct member states to comply with the program it has
adopted, rather than merely suggesting or recommending courses
15
of action.
Resolution 1373 set up a special monitoring body, the
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), which receives reports from
16
member states indicating their compliance with the resolution.
To date, this committee has received initial reports from nearly
all of the member states of the United Nations and as many as
17
three or four reports from some countries.
The CTC reviews
these reports and asks specific and pointed questions of the
member states, obviously prodding them toward further
compliance with the resolution through specific and concrete
11. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1373
(2001), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001.htm.
12. Id. at 2.
13. Id. at 3.
14. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
15. Id. art. 39.
16. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 11, at 3.
17. United Nations, Counter-Terrorism Committee, States’ Reports, at
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/reports.html (last visited May 11, 2004).
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directions.
As human rights experts noted, however, Resolution 1373
contained two worrisome gaps — the lack of any definition of
18
terrorism and the lack of any mandatory concurrent compliance
with human rights norms in carrying out the fight against
19
Since the start of international efforts to fight
terrorism.
terrorism, attempts to create a comprehensive approach to
counter-terrorism policy have been stalled again and again by the
absence of agreement on what “terrorism” encompasses. Can
terrorism be committed by states or only by sub-national entities?
Is it a set of specific techniques? Or necessarily attached to an
overt political program?
Are the violent tactics used by
independence movements included in the definition of terrorism?
Can criminal networks like drug traffickers or money launderers
be counted among terrorists?
Questions like these have
prevented international agreement in the past, and rather than
20
wait for a common view of what terrorism includes, the Security
Council acted to enlist the energies of member states to fight it.
Without some common definition of terrorism, however, there is a
concern that states will use counter-terrorism efforts to suppress
political opposition or use militaristic techniques against “mere”
criminals. The potential to apply the “terrorism” label to any
politically disruptive individuals or groups carries with it a clear
potential for abuse.
Another major worry about Security Council Resolution 1373
is that it does not explicitly link compliance with the resolution to
compliance with human rights norms. Sir Jeremy Greenstock,
the first chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, made
the disconnect clear:
The Counter-Terrorism Committee is mandated to monitor
the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). Monitoring
performance against other international conventions,
including human rights law, is outside the scope of the

18. TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM, supra note 2, at 30.
19. Id. at 31.
20. The UN General Assembly is apparently working on a framework treaty for
dealing with terrorism, but the link on the CTC’s website to a definition of terrorism
points only to the General Assembly webpage without any further detail. United
Nations, Counter-Terrorism Committee, A Definition of Terrorism, at
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/definition.html (last visited May 12,
2004).
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Counter-Terrorism Committee’s mandate.
But we will
remain aware of the interaction with human rights concerns,
and we will keep ourselves briefed as appropriate. It is, of
course, open to other organizations to study States’ reports
21
and take up their content in other forums.

Since the UN system’s provisions for monitoring human rights
compliance consists only of bodies that have the power to “name
and shame” without the power to mandate specific actions on the
part of states that violate human rights, the abdication of the
human rights field by the Security Council’s own terrorism
committee is disturbing because only the Security Council has the
power to order sanctions.
B. THE EUROPEAN UNION
Since terrorist attacks have a longer history in Europe than
in the United States, a number of European countries— Britain,
France, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain among them— already
had enacted comprehensive counter-terrorism laws before
22
September 11.
The European Union (EU) itself did not have
such a comprehensive, substantive framework for fighting
21. United Nations, Counter-Terrorism Committee, Terrorism and Human Rights
(quoting Sir Jeremy Greenstock), at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/
1373/human_rights.html (last visited May 12, 2004). Since this is the first offering
on the Counter-Terrorism Committee’s webpage in its link to the subject of human
rights and terrorism, one might reasonably conclude that the signal being overtly
sent to member states seeking to comply with Resolution 1373 is that they do not
have to worry much about compliance with human rights norms. In a later meeting,
however, Sir Jeremy apparently said that CTC is giving a prominent role to human
rights, but the only reference available for this statement is found in a first-hand
report of a special meeting where the comment was apparently made orally. TASK
FORCE ON TERRORISM, supra note 2, at 31. The website remains unchanged.
In January 2003, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1456, which
encouraged all states to follow Resolution 1373. Buried in Resolution 1456 is the
following admonition: “States must ensure that any measure taken to combat
terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, and should adopt
such measures in accordance with international law, in particular international
human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.” S.C. Res. 1456, U.N. SCOR, 4688th
meeting,
S/RES/1456
(2003)
at
6
available
at
http://ods-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/216/05/PDF/N0321605.pdf?OpenElement. The UN
Security Council apparently added this after successive UN High Commissioners for
Human Rights had testified before them that more attention to human rights was
urgent and necessary. See United Nations, Office for the High Commission on
Human
Rights,
Terrorism
and
Human
Rights,
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/terrorism/ (last visited June 19, 2004). But Resolution 1456 is
not brought under Chapter VII, and so it might justly be read as optional.
22. TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM, supra note 2, at 34 n.30.
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terrorism as a domestic threat because terrorism was, according
to the EU’s structure of responsibilities, to be primarily regulated
23
through each EU member state’s criminal law framework.
Criminal law is a “Justice and Home Affairs” responsibility,
structured as the “third pillar” within the EU’s “three pillar”
24
framework. As such, terrorism was not a subject for community
lawmaking but could only be fought in EU terms within a
framework of mutual agreement among member states. After
September 11, however, the EU moved to speed up cooperation
and the creation of new institutional frameworks to deal with
terrorism across all member states, giving a sharp push to
further EU integration in this area.
A special meeting of the General Affairs Council of Ministers
was held on September 12, during which it “reaffirm[ed] its
determination to combat all forms of terrorism with all the
25
resources at its disposal.”
The Council of Justice and Home
Affairs Ministers, which met later that month, agreed on a
variety of concrete proposals that would result in more
coordination and cooperation between police and intelligence
26
services throughout the EU. A month later, the General Affairs
27
Council adopted an anti-terrorism “roadmap” that included a
23. In the one exception to this, in 1986, the European Community put into place
a Counter-Terrorism Working Group called COTER. This group was tasked with
responsibilities under what later came to be known as the second pillar of the EU
framework —foreign and security matters. These second-pillar efforts were also
bolstered after 9/11. See Monica den Boer, “9/11 and the Europeanization of AntiTerrorism Policy: A Critical Assessment.” Notre Europe, Policy Paper #6, Sept. 2003,
at 19 available at http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr/fichiers/Policypaper6.pdf.
24. The EU’s increasing legal integration has taken place around a structure of
three different sorts of understandings about the relationship between community
and national law. In “first pillar” areas like economic regulation, and other areas
explicitly outlined by the set of treaties that make up EU law, EU law is superior to
and binding on the member states and is enforceable by the European Court of
Justice. European Union, Structure of the European Union: The Three Pillars, at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/about/abc/abc_12.html (last visited May 12, 2004). In
the “second pillar” area of foreign and security policy, as well as in the “third pillar”
area of justice and home affairs, the EU may only act by cooperation and consensus
among all of the member states through their adjustments of national laws and
policy. Id.
25. Press Release, European Union, General Affairs Council (Sept. 12, 2001), at
http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/newmain.asp?LANG=1.
26. See Conclusions Adopted by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs),
September 20, 2001. Doc. SN 3926/6/01 REV 6.
27. Council of the European Union, Note From the Presidency, available at
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/01/st12/12800-r1en1.pdf (last visited May 11,
2004).
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proposal for a European arrest warrant and the creation of
Eurojust, an agency tasked with improving judicial and
28
prosecutorial cooperation within the community. Though these
proposals had been on the drawing board before September 11,
the attacks in the United States hastened their passage from
29
plan to reality. Eurojust was authorized in February 2002,
adding judicial and prosecutorial coordination to the existing
Europol policing power. The pan-European arrest warrant was
30
finalized in June 2002, despite substantial worries about the
abolition of the prior rule of double criminality, which had limited
extraditions within the EU to persons accused of actions defined
as crimes in both the sending and receiving country. The debates
over the pan-European arrest warrant sharply focused attention
on the differences among EU member states in their substantive
criminal law. Neither Eurojust nor the pan-European arrest
warrant is limited to terrorism offenses, but their adoption
occurred in the shadow of concern over terrorism.
Perhaps the most significant step taken by the EU,
specifically on the topic of terrorism, was the adoption in June
31
2002 of a Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism. This
provided a common definition of terrorist acts that member states
were committed to adopting as part of their domestic, substantive
32
criminal law. The structure of the terrorism definition in the
Framework Decision bears strong resemblance to hate crime
legislation; particular offenses can be punished more harshly if
33
done with a particular motivation. The specific motivation to

28. Council of the European Union, Coordination of Implementation of the Plan of
Action to Combat Terrorism, Doc. 12800/01 REV 1 (Oct. 17, 2001).
29. Council Decision Setting up Eurojust with a View to Reinforcing the Fight
against Serious Crime, Doc. 2002/187/JHA (Feb. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.eurojust.eu.int/pdfdec/l_06320020306en00010013.pdf (last visited June
19, 2004).
30. Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the
Surrender Procedures Between Member States, Doc. 2002/584/JHA (June 13, 2002),
2002 O.J. (L 190) 45 [hereinafter Council Framework Decision], available at
www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_190/l_19020020718en00010018.pdf
(last visited May 13, 2004).
31. Council of the European Union, Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism,
Doc. 2002/475/JHA, 2002 O.J. (L 164) (June 13, 2002) 3 [hereinafter Framework
Decision on Combating Terrorism], available at http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_164/l_16420020622en00030007.pdf (last visited June 19,
2004).
32. Id.
33. The list of concrete actions that can constitute terrorism if done with the
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intimidate a population, pressure a government or destabilize a
country is what brings an ordinary criminal act into the realm of
34
a terrorist offense. Here, too, the concern is over the breadth of
the definition, particularly as terrorist actions have an
irreducibly political quality, which they share with legitimate
political dissent. If, as the International Bar Association Task
Force on Terrorism points out, a demonstrator burns a city bus as
a way of making a political point about what the government
should do, this could be considered a very serious terrorist offense
35
punishable by a very harsh sentence. Alternatively, to continue
the parade of worrying hypotheticals, someone who interrupts the
process of fluoridating water to pressure the government to take
the health risks of chemically treated water seriously might be in
the same boat. Setting fire to a flag to protest a government
action could also be counted as a terrorist act, if the fire
accidentally spread. One can easily add to the examples where
political dissent might cross over into being considered a terrorist
offense, under the EU definition.
Along with the redefinition of terrorism offenses,
recommendations were made both for harsher punishments and
for expansion of the set of potential terrorists to include terrorist
36
groups, as well as individual terrorists.
Punishment for
terrorism offenses was also extended to those who incited, aided
or abetted such crimes. In addition, the Framework Decision
created the category of a “terrorist-linked” offense that could also
37
be punished as terrorism.
These terrorist-linked offenses
included aggravated theft, extortion and production of false
38
documents to support a terrorist act.
appropriate motivation includes: attacks upon life or physical integrity; kidnapping
or hostage taking; destroying government facilities, public facilities or transportation
systems; seizing aircraft or other means of transportation; doing nearly anything
with biological or chemical weapons; releasing dangerous substances into the
environment or causing fires, floods or explosions; interfering with the supply of
water or other public utilities or threatening to commit any of these acts. Id. art.
1(1).
34. The relevant motivation is defined as “seriously intimidating a population, or
unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain
from performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental
political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international
organization.” Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, supra note 31, art. 1(1).
35. TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM, supra note 2, at 35.
36. Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, supra note 31, art. 2.
37. Id. art. 3.
38. Id.
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The Framework Decision required all EU member states to
pass legislation implementing its provisions within six months, so
that all EU states, in theory, would have harmonious laws on the
39
books by the end of 2002. To ensure continued compliance, the
Council put into place a system for expert evaluation of the steps
that member states were taking to comply with the Framework
40
Decision.
September 11 seems to have sped up development, already
in progress, toward a common policing and security policy across
Europe. With respect to terrorism offenses, one might say that
September 11 created pressure for harmonization of domestic
criminal law across the EU faster than previously thought
possible.
III. EUROPEAN PATRIOT ACTS: GERMANY AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM
Operating under the UN Security Council Resolution 1373
and the EU’s Framework Decision on Terrorism, how have
individual European states dealt with the new urgency of a
terrorist threat? At a minimum, one might reasonably guess that
both Security Council Resolution 1373 and the EU Council
Framework Decision would require a fair amount of tinkering
41
with domestic law, and tinker many countries did.
After
September 11, two new European national laws stand out. A
post-September 11 law was rushed through the British
Parliament, even though a broad codification of its piecemeal
42
anti-terrorism laws had been adopted a year earlier. Germany,
which had numerous partial pre-September 11 anti-terrorism
39. Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, supra note 31, art. 11.
40. Council of the European Union, Council Decision Establishing a Mechanism
for Evaluating the Legal Systems and their Implementation at National Level in the
Fight Against Terrorism, Doc. 21715/02, 2002 O.J. (L 349) 1 (Oct. 11, 2002), available
at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/st12/12715en2.pdf (last visited May 12,
2004).
41. See, e.g., United Nations, Report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee
Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001
(providing an explanation of the legislative actions taken in the British Parliament to
address
terrorism
after
September
11),
available
at
http://ods-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/715/09/PDF/N0171509 (last visited May 13, 2004).
Reports
of
other
member
states
are
available
at
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/submitted_reports.html (last visited May
13, 2004).
42. For a detailed guide to both laws, see CLIVE WALKER, BLACKSTONE’S GUIDE TO
THE ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION (2002).
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43

laws, adopted changes to both its criminal code and also to its
44
investigative procedures shortly after September 11.
In reviewing European post-September 11 laws, this article
focuses on Germany and the United Kingdom (UK). These two
countries have been chosen because they represent very different
approaches to terrorism prevention. Germany’s approach is
highly formalized with many checks provided by both separation
of powers and judicial review of rights violations. Britain’s
approach, however, is more casual and consensual. Since its
increasing integration into European institutions, the UK,
however reluctantly, has been moving toward a more formal
system for the protection of civil liberties. Since Germany and
Britain were the two European countries to rush to enact
relatively broad terrorism laws after September 11, this also
makes for a good comparison of alternatives.
The consideration of these two frameworks will of necessity
be only partial. Just as it is difficult to work through the layers of
secrecy in the United States to see how counter-terrorism policy
works in practice, it is also difficult to see through the secrecy in
the European processes around security issues to view how the
laws on the books are carried out in practice. But, as in the
United States, it is possible to review the legal framework
regulating such processes, which themselves reveal a great deal
about a country’s strategy for fighting terrorism.
A. GERMANY
Given Germany’s past history of aggression against its
neighbors and its massive violations of human rights against
targeted populations in the first half of the twentieth century, the
German Basic Law (Constitution) of 1949 instituted a number of
serious safeguards both against militarism and against the
danger of human rights violations. The new constitution was to
45
prevent such things from ever happening again. As a result, the
43. For an account in English of the relevant anti-terrorism legislation in
Germany before September 11, see James I. Nelson, Antiterrorismus: The German
Experience with Politically Motivated Violence, 20 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 563 (2002).
44. See Oliver Lepsius, The Relationship Between Security and Civil Liberties in
the Federal Republic of Germany After September 11 (Am. Inst. for Contemporary
German Studies Working Paper 2002) (discussing German Counter-Terrorism
legislation and the balance between security and liberty after September 11),
available at http://www.aicgs.org/publications/PDF/lepsiusenglish.pdf.
45. The Preamble to the Basic Law indicates this renunciation of the past:
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German constitutional order has an unusually large number of
checks on concentrations of power as well as avenues for
complaint about the violations of human rights in conjunction
46
with policing, security, and defense matters.
First, the German Basic Law renounces aggressive military
action against other states and indicates that actions leading to
47
war must be criminalized. Instead, principles of international
law are automatically incorporated as federal law, superior to
statutes, directly creating both rights and duties for inhabitants
48
of Germany.
This incorporation of international law
constitutionalizes the right for all those residing in Germany to
appeal to international bodies, particularly the European Court of
Human Rights, for redress of human rights infringements,
presumably even in a time of crisis.
When it comes to crises, the German Basic Law, through
amendment in 1968, adopted explicit textual guidance for what
49
could and could not be done in “states of defense.” In the public
“Conscious of their responsibility before God and men, moved by the purpose to serve
world peace as an equal part in a unified Europe, the German People have adopted,
by virtue of their constituent power, this Constitution.”
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] translated in THE BASIC LAW (GRUNDGESETZ)
(Axel Tschentscher trans., 2002) available at http://www.jurisprudentia.de/
jurisprudentia.html.
46. See infra notes 47-87.
47. Article 26 [Ban on War]
(1) Acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relations
between nations, especially to prepare war or aggression, are unconstitutional.
They have to be made a criminal offence.

Id. art. 26(1), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 31.
48. Article 25 [Public International Law]
The general rules of public international law constitute an integral part of
federal law. They take precedence over statutes and directly create rights and
duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory.

Id. art. 25, translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 31.
protection applies to all residents, not just citizens.
49. Article 80a [State of Defence]

Note that this

(1) Where this Constitution or a federal statute on defence, including the
protection of the civilian population, stipulates that legal provisions may only be
applied in accordance with this Article, their application is, except in a state of
defence, admissible only after the House of Representatives [Bundestag] has
determined that a state of tension exists or where it has specifically approved
such application. In respect of the cases mentioned in Article 12a V 1 & VI 2,
such determination of a state of tension and such specific approval requires a
two-thirds majority of the votes cast.
(2) Any measures taken by virtue of legal provisions enacted under Paragraph I
have to be revoked whenever the House of Representatives [Bundestag] so
demands.
(3) In derogation of Paragraph I, the application of such legal provisions is also
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debates surrounding the adoption of these amendments, the
50
“trauma of Weimar” was ever-present, since the Weimar
Constitution’s infamous Article 48 detailing a constitutional
procedure for a state of emergency had assisted the dissolution of
the constitution in 1933 and permitted the rise of Nazi
51
government.
As a result, the present Basic Law requires
approval of both houses of Parliament for the declaration and
maintenance of states of defense, taking such discretion out of the
52
hands of the executive. If the Parliament cannot meet, a joint
admissible by virtue of and in accordance with a decision taken with the consent
of the Government by an international body within the framework of a treaty of
alliance. Any measures taken pursuant to this paragraph have to be revoked
whenever the House of Representatives [Bundestag] so demands with the
majority of its members.

Id. art. 80a, translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 88-93.
Article 115g [Functions of Federal Constitutional Court]
The constitutional status and the performance of the constitutional functions of
the Federal Constitutional Court and its judges may not be impaired. The
Federal Constitutional Court Act may not be amended by a statute enacted by
the Joint Committee except insofar as such amendment is required, also in the
opinion of the Federal Constitutional Court, to maintain the capability of the
Court to function. Pending the enactment of such a statute, the Federal
Constitutional Court may take such measures as are necessary to maintain the
capability of the Court to carry out its work. Any decisions by the Federal
Constitutional Court in pursuance of the second and third sentence of this
Article requires a two-thirds majority of the judges present.

Id. art. 115g, translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 59-60.
A number of the permissible limitations on rights that are later discussed were also
part of the 1968 amendments. It may be useful in the present context to note that
1968 was a year of substantial domestic upheaval in Germany and the amendments
were immensely controversial when they were adopted. However, the major
domestic terrorism campaigns in Germany by the Baader-Meinhof Gang and the Red
Army Brigades did not start until 1970.
50. C. C. Schweitzer, Emergency Powers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 22
W. POL. Q. 112, 113 (1969).
51. Id.
52. Article 115a [State of Defence]
(1) The determination that federal territory is being attacked by armed force or
that such an attack is directly imminent (state of defence) are made by the
House of Representatives [Bundestag] with the consent of the Senate
[Bundesrat]. Such determination are made at the request of the Government
and require a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, which include at least the
majority of the members of the House of Representatives [Bundestag].
(2) Where the situation imperatively calls for immediate action and where
insurmountable obstacles prevent the timely assembly of the House of
Representatives [Bundestag], or where there is no quorum in the House of
Representatives [Bundestag], the Joint Committee makes this determination
with a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, which includes at least the majority
of its members.
(3) The determination is promulgated in the Federal Law Gazette by the
President pursuant to Article 82. Where this cannot be done in time, the
promulgation is effected in another manner; subsequently, it has to be printed in
the Federal Law Gazette as soon as circumstances permit.
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committee of members of both chambers can perform the
functions that would normally be performed by the whole of each
53
body, but the executive cannot act alone.
In addition to the substantial protections against arbitrarily
declared or executive-dominated states of defense, the German
Basic Law is unusually precise in indicating what can and cannot
be done domestically in the name of national defense with respect
to infringement on fundamental rights. For example, Article
17(a) of the Basic Law indicates that statutes enacted for national
defense in order to protect the population may place limited
restrictions on two of the fundamental rights— that of freedom of
54
movement (Article 11) and inviolability of the home (Article 13).
Through this precise accounting, it is clear that other basic rights
cannot be restricted in exceptional ways even in the name of
55
national defense. As part of the constitutional elaboration of the
(4) Where the federal territory is being attacked by armed force and where the
competent bodies of the Federation are not in a position at once to make the
determination provided for in Paragraph 1, such determination is deemed to
have been made and promulgated at the time the attack began. The President
announces such time as soon as circumstances permit.
(5) Where the determination of the existence of a state of defence has been
promulgated and where the federal territory is being attacked by armed force,
the President may, with the consent of the House of Representatives
[Bundestag], issue declarations under international law regarding the existence
of such state of defence. Where the conditions mentioned in Paragraph 2 apply,
the Joint Committee acts in substitution for the House of Representatives
[Bundestag].

GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 115a (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW,
supra note 45, at 90-91.
53. Id. art. 115(a)(2).
54. Article 17a(2): “Statutes serving defence purposes including the protection of
the civilian population can provide for the restriction of the basic rights of freedom of
movement (Article 11) and inviolability of the home (Article 13).”
Id. art. 17a(2), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 26-27.
55. Article 19 of the Basic Law governs how rights may be limited in normal
times. Judicial review is always available to determine whether rights have been
limited in appropriate ways, save in cases of alleged violation of the right of privacy
of communication, which substitutes a form of parliamentary review for the usual
judicial review.
Article 19 [Restriction of Basic Rights]
(1) Insofar as a basic right may, under this Constitution, be restricted by or
pursuant to a statute, such statute must apply generally and not solely to an
individual case.
Furthermore, such statute must name the basic right,
indicating the relevant Article.
(2) In no case may the essence of a basic right be infringed.
(3) Basic rights also apply to domestic corporations to the extent that the nature
of such rights permits.
(4) Should any personʹs rights be violated by public authority, recourse to the
court is open to him. Insofar as no other jurisdiction has been established,
recourse is available to the courts of ordinary jurisdiction. Article 10(2) is not
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state of defense under Article 115, the Basic Law is explicit that
the Constitutional Court must remain open and functional during
56
the crisis.
This three-part structure —renouncing war while adopting
international law, providing substantial separation-of-powers
barriers against arbitrariness and executive overreaching in
declaring domestic states of defense, and protecting individual
rights during states of crisis —has strong implications for antiterrorism activities. It tends to channel anti-terrorism measures
from a war footing to a criminal-law footing because the defensebased measures are nearly impossible to invoke. Thinking of the
anti-terrorism campaign after September 11 as a “war” was
57
simply not an obvious constitutional possibility.
As a result, anti-terrorism campaigns have been handled
largely through criminal law and criminal procedure. But if one
goes looking through the Basic Law for the constitutional anchor
for specific rights of criminal defendants, one will find few.
Specifically, constitutional provisions regarding judicial review of
arrests and detention can be found in Article 104, which indicates
that those detained must be brought before a judge before the end
of the day after detention, if the arrest is made without prior
warrant or provisionally on “suspicion of [the individual] having
58
committed an offense.” No detention can be continued without
affected by the provisions of this paragraph.

GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 115g (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW,
supra note 45, at 31.
56. Id. art. 115g, translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 93.
57. As Oliver Lepsius explains, “In Germany, the attacks [of September 11] were
perceived as a qualitatively new type of an act of terrorism, not as an act of war. For
Germans a dividing line between terrorism and war was maintained.” Lepsius,
supra note 44, at *6.
58. Article 104 [Legal Guarantees to Protect Liberty]
(1) The liberty of the individual may be restricted only by virtue of a formal
statute and only in compliance with the forms prescribed therein. Detained
persons may not be subjected to mental or to physical ill-treatment.
(2) Only judges may decide on the admissibility or continuation of any
deprivation of liberty. Where such deprivation is not based on the order of a
judge, a judicial decision has to be obtained without delay. The police may hold
no one on their own authority in their own custody longer than the end of the
day after the day of apprehension. Details are regulated by legislation.
(3) Any person provisionally detained on suspicion of having committed an
offence has to be brought, not later than the day following the day of
apprehension, before a judge who has to inform him of the reasons for the
detention, examine him, and give him an opportunity to raise objections. The
judge, without delay, has to either issue a warrant of arrest setting forth the
reasons therefor or order his release from detention.
(4) A relative or a person enjoying the confidence of the person detained has to
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judicial approval and no detention can be effected at all unless
59
Additionally, no
pursuant to a properly enacted statute.
60
detainee may be subjected to either mental or physical abuse.
Beyond these provisions, the constitution says little about the
61
rights of criminal suspects. However, this is only the surface of
the Basic Law.
Instead of including rights like the presumption of innocence
and the right to counsel in the Basic Law, the German Code of
62
Criminal Procedure regulates such things. The Code, however,
is considered to be the “constitutionalization” of this area of law
since both the rule-of-law clause and the fundamental rights
63
listed in the Basic Law permeate the Code. Behind the Code is a
constitutionally required respect for basic principles of the
fundamental rights, such as the principle that human dignity is
64
inviolable and without limitation. Fundamental rights do not
altogether block investigative methods or surveillance, but they
greatly limit the extent to which such methods can be used. For
65
example, the protection of liberty
and privacy of
be notified without delay of any judicial decision imposing or ordering the
continuation of his deprivation of liberty.

GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 104 (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at
78-79.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Article 103 of the Basic Law protects due process, including the right to a
hearing, the right not to be tried twice for the same offense and the right to be tried
only for criminal offenses defined as such when the act in question was committed:
Article 103 [Due Process]
(1) In the courts, everyone is entitled to a hearing in accordance with the law.
(2) An act can be punished only where it constituted a criminal offence under the
law before the act was committed.
(3) No one may be punished for the same act more than once under general
criminal legislation.

Id. art. 103, translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 78.
62. An English translation of the German Code of Criminal Procedure can be
found at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StPO.htm (last visited June 19, 2004).
63. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional
Criminal Procedure in an International Context, 75 IND. L.J. 809, 814 n.29 (2000).
64. Article 1 [Human Dignity]
(1) Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty of all state
authority.
(2) The German People therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human
rights as the basis of every human community, of peace, and of justice in the
world.

GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 1 (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at
18.
65. Article 2 [Liberty]
(1) Everyone has the right to free development of his personality insofar as he
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66

communications are to be read throughout the criminal
procedure code as substantial barriers on police and prosecutorial
activity. When any right is infringed, the Basic Law requires
67
that such infringement never touch the “essence” of the right.
However, in the case of privacy of communications in Article 10,
there was a lively debate as to whether constitutional
amendments made in 1968 themselves infringed the essence of
the right. The 1968 amendments allowed infringement on
privacy of communications if the restriction “serves the protection
of the free democratic basic order or the existence or security of
68
the Federation . . . .”
Moreover, the amendment substituted
parliamentary oversight for judicial review to rule on cases of
69
individual violation. The result was the creation of Article 10
70
review bodies, which is further discussed below.
This limitation on privacy of communications is
uncharacteristically broad and vague in the German
constitutional scheme of things. The amendment was therefore
itself
constitutionally
challenged
before
the
Federal
71
Constitutional Court in the Klass case.
Because of this
extraordinary limitation on a constitutionally protected right and
the fact that judicial review of violations of the right was to be
barred in these cases, the dissenting judges were willing to
does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or
morality.
(2) Everyone has the right to life and to physical integrity. The freedom of the
person is inviolable. Intrusion on these rights may only be made pursuant to a
statute.

Id. art. 2, translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 18.
66. Article 10 [Letters, Mail, Telecommunication]
(1) The privacy of letters as well as the secrecy of post and telecommunication
are inviolable.
(2) Restrictions may only be ordered pursuant to a statute. Where a restriction
serves the protection of the free democratic basic order or the existence or
security of the Federation or a State [Land], the statute may stipulate that the
person affected shall not be informed and that recourse to the courts shall be
replaced by a review of the case by bodies and auxiliary bodies appointed by
Parliament.

GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 10 (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW,
supra note 45, at 21.
67. Id. art. 19(2), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 27.
68. Id. art. 10(2), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 21.
69. Id.
70. See infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
71. The Klass Case, Judgment of 15 December 1970, BVerfGE 30, 1. An edited
English translation can be found at Privacy of Communications (Klass) case,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARIES 660 (Walter F.
Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus trans. & eds., 1977).
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declare that the constitutional amendment allowing infringement
72
of the privacy of communications was itself unconstitutional.
The majority, however, was evidently persuaded to uphold the
amendment against the challenge on the grounds that the
Parliament had at least substituted a form of individualized
73
parliamentary review for judicial review. The majority rejected
the part of the statute that prohibited notification of the target of
the surveillance after the surveillance was completed, indicating
that a targeted person had to be informed of such surveillance,
otherwise the right to challenge it would effectively be taken
74
away. It seems that the idea that a constitutional amendment
could be unconstitutional was too radical for the majority. This
decision was followed by a confirming ruling from European
Court of Human Rights, reaching the same conclusion that the
parliamentary mechanisms were enough to ensure the realization
75
of the right to privacy. The European Court of Human Rights,
however, expressed some concern that judicial review had been
expressly blocked in this area.
The amendment to Article 10 of the Basic Law later
produced another Constitutional Court challenge. This time the
challenged practices related to “strategic surveillance” of wireless
76
communications.
In American terms, strategic surveillance
would be called signals intercepts, and it would, as in Germany,
be used for the more diffuse purpose of national security
protection, rather than for the more concrete search for evidence
77
of crime.
In Germany, the challenged form of surveillance
involved computer screening of international communications to
determine whether certain key words or phrases appeared in
these communications. If such clues appeared, then individually
identifiable communications might be subjected to human review.
If evidence of a crime were found through such surveillance, it
could be turned over to the relevant state agencies for further
72. The Klass Case, BVerfGE 30, 1. See infra notes 303-08 for further discussion
of the Klass case.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Klass v. Germany, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214 (1979).
76. The Case of Professor Dr. K, Judgment of 14 July 1999, BVerfGE 100, 317,
translation of the Federal Constitutional Court. I would like to thank Russell Miller
for providing me with this translation of the decision.
77. See generally for the United States, William C. Banks and M.E. Bowman,
Executive Authority For National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 7-10
(2000).
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action even though the procedures through which the evidence
was gathered in the first place involved no individuated suspicion
that the target of the surveillance had done anything wrong
before the surveillance was undertaken. Strategic surveillance,
according to the Federal Constitutional Court, was permissible in
theory, but the state had to take more measures than it presently
had to ensure that data collection, transfer, and retention of
individually identifiable information were kept to a minimum.
Such measures also had to be continually reviewed so that they
remained narrowly tailored to achieve the legitimate statutory
objectives of the security agencies and of any other state agencies
to which individually identifiable information might be passed
78
Restrictions on the right to privacy of communications
on.
guaranteed in the Basic Law were only permissible if they were
proportional to the objectives, a balance which, the court said, the
challenged law had not struck properly because it allowed the
relatively easy distribution of personally identifiable information
79
for a wide variety of purposes. Either the Parliament had to
restrict the range of purposes for which the data could be used if
the data transfers were to be as easy as they were in the
challenged law, the court said, or the data transfers had to be
made much more difficult to accomplish if the purposes for which
the data could be used were of such great breadth. Consequently,
the court declared parts of the surveillance law to be
80
unconstitutional.
In another area where fundamental rights might bear on
criminal investigation and surveillance, Article 13(1) says plainly,
81
“The home is inviolable.” In 1998, this article of the Basic Law
was amended to allow electronic bugging of a home, but only
82
The amendment, now
under highly restricted circumstances.
Article 13(2)-(7), indicates that surveillance inside a home might
be undertaken only “If specific facts lead to the assumption that

78.
79.
80.
81.

The Case of Professor Dr. K, BVerfGE 100, 317, supra note 76.
Id.
Id.
Article 13(1): “The home is inviolable.”
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 13(1) (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45,
at 23.
82. Article 13(2): “Searches may be ordered only by a judge or, in the event of
danger resulting from any delay, by other organs legally specified, and they may be
carried out only in the form prescribed by law.”
Id. art. 13(2), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 23.
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83

Furthermore,
someone has committed a very grave crime.”
surveillance may be conducted only on the order of a three-judge
panel for a limited duration upon the showing that other methods
84
of discovering the information are unlikely to be successful.
However, in an urgent situation, a single judge may approve such
85
an order.
Information gained through such surveillance may
only be used “to conduct criminal prosecution or to avoid danger,
and only if the legality of the measure has been stated by court
86
order.” Before 1998, bugging of a home was considered to be a
violation of Article 13 and, at least according to one judge, “judges
were not competent to authorize such investigative measures.
And, self-evidently, the police and the public prosecutor were
thus not allowed to implement them. Our [German] criminal
87
prosecution authorities have obeyed this.”
The German Constitution guarantees judicial review of all
alleged rights violations with the exception of those specifically
88
The aggressive
exempted in the amendment to Article 10.
protection of basic rights, which has been exercised by the
Federal Constitutional Court in particular, has had a strong
83. Article 13(3):
If specific facts lead to the assumption that someone has committed a very grave
crime, technical means of eavesdropping in homes where that person probably
stays may be ordered by court if the investigation by other means would be
unproportionally obstructed or without chance of success. The measure has to be
limited. The order is issued by a court of three justices. In the event of danger
resulting from any delay, the order can be issued by a single judge.

Id. art. 13(3), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 23-24.
84. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 13(3) (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra
note 45, at 23.
85. Id.
86. Article 13(5):
In the case of technical means being exclusively ordered for the protection of
investigators during their activity in homes, the measure can be ordered by
those authorities empowered by law. Evidence from such investigation may be
used for other purposes only to conduct criminal prosecution or avoid danger and
only if the legality of the measure has been stated by court order; in the event of
danger resulting form any delay, a subsequent court order has to be arranged for
without delay.

Id. art. 13(5), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 24.
87. Volker F. Krey, Characteristic Features of German Criminal Proceedings — An
Alternative to the Criminal Procedure Law of the United States?, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L.J. 591, 594 (1999). Volker F. Krey served on the German Court of Appeals
from 1978 to 1998. Id. at 591 n.1. A later Constitutional Court decision indicates
that judges still find such methods constitutionally problematic, even with the
constitutional amendment. See infra note 149.
88. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 19(4) (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra
note 55, at 27. For the amendments to art. 10, see THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at
21.
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effect on other public institutions.
In light of these strong constitutional commitments, both to
anti-militarism and to human rights, how can Germany defend
itself, either against crime of the ordinary sort or against
terrorism on a grander scale? The first line of defense is through
the ordinary police who, in the scheme of German federalism,
tend to be strongest at the state (Land) level because they have
the capacity to enforce not only state law, but federal law as
89
well.
While there is a Federal Criminal Police Office (the
Bundeskriminalamt or BKA), it is relatively weaker than the
American FBI. The BKA is limited to: (1) matters that cross the
borders of states and that therefore cannot be controlled by the
state-level police alone and (2) investigation of international
90
crimes over which the separate states have no jurisdiction. As
we have already seen, the constitutionalized Code of Criminal
Procedure contains relatively strict regulation of police conduct in
investigations.
Germany has three major intelligence services, though with
the end of the Cold War and the unification of Germany some
91
have challenged the need to have intelligence institutions at all.
The intelligence services are not only institutionally separated
from the police and from each other, but they are also physically
92
separated in different cities as well. The attacks of September
89. See Nelson, supra note 43, at 577-79 (providing an overview of the German
agencies charged with fighting terrorism).
90. Id. at 578-79.
91. Shlomo Shpiro, Parliament, Media and Control of the Intelligence Services in
Germany, in DEMOCRACY, LAW AND SECURITY: INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICES IN
CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 294, 295 (Jean-Paul Brodeur et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter
Shpiro, Parliament, Media and Control of the Intelligence Services in Germany].
92. One of the interesting aspects of German separation of powers, copied by a
number of countries, is that institutional separation of powers is often accompanied
by physical separation of the institutions in different geographical locations. This
means that the occupants of the various offices tend not to socialize with each other,
which increases the institutional separation. As Jane Kramer, writing in the New
Yorker, states:
In a country still so nervous about displays of power that it is considered
unseemly even to talk about turning Berlin’s Philharmonic into a national
orchestra, it isn’t surprising that most of the people charged with identifying,
investigating, arresting, and prosecuting terrorists don’t usually get anywhere
near the capital, or even anywhere near one another. Germany has as many
spies and cops as the next country. Eight thousand people are attached to the
Verfassungsschutz and the B.N.D., five thousand to the B.K.A. But the old
Allied imperative of 1949 — power in Germany must never again be
centralized —still holds. The Verfassungsschutz is headquartered in Cologne;
the B.N.D. in Pullach, about half an hour from Munich; the Federal Prosecutor
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11 resulted in some expansion of their previous powers, but by
and large the basic structure of the intelligence services remains
the same.
The Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst
or BND) is tasked with collecting and analyzing security-related
information originating outside Germany, including signals
93
intelligence.
It is institutionally housed in the Office of the
Federal Chancellor and is physically located just outside of
94
Munich. The BND has no domestic jurisdiction. The Military
Counter-Intelligence Branch (Militaerischer Abschirmdienst or
MAD) deals with security issues within the military and has no
95
civilian jurisdiction. Therefore, the institution of most interest
to us in considering investigation and surveillance within
Germany is the domestic security service, named appropriately
enough, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution
(Bundesamt für Verfassungschutz or BfV).
The BfV is
responsible for counter-espionage activities within Germany and
is also supposed to monitor a wide variety of domestically based
96
extremist groups. It is institutionally housed within the Federal
97
Ministry of the Interior and is physically based in Cologne. It
works with counterparts at the state level, but the federal level is
by far the more powerful.
98

The BfV’s statutory mandate is explicit and limited. The
office carries out its investigations primarily through the use of
publicly available documents and methods available to all (for
example, attending public meetings, reading newspapers,
carrying out surveillance of subjects in public places or through
in Karlsruhe; the B.K.A. in Wiesbaden; and the state security offices of the
B.K.A. in a town called Meckenheim, in North Rhine-Westphalia, which most
Germans have yet to locate on a map.

Jane Kramer, Letter from Europe: Germany’s Troubled War on Terrorism, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 11, 2002, at 36.
93. See Shlomo Shpiro, Parliamentary and Administrative Reforms in the Control
of Intelligence Services in the European Union, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 545, 550-51
(1998) [hereinafter Shpiro, Parliamentary and Administrative Reforms] (discussing
the structure of the German Intelligence Service).
94. Id. at 551.
95. Shpiro, Parliament, Media and Control of the Intelligence Services in
Germany, supra note 91, at 296.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. [Federal Constitution Protection Law] (BVerfSchG), v. 20.12.1990 (BGB1. I S.
867), translation available at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/germany/docs/bverfg.htm
(last visited May 12, 2004).
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voluntary interviews). The organization may also use agents to
infiltrate groups, engage in postal checks or electronic
surveillance (subject to the procedures of Article 10 of the
99
constitution, elaborated below) and use secret photography.
However, the BfV does not “carry out any executive measures
(arrests, search of premises, interrogations, confiscation of items).
If the BfV establishes that judicial and police measures are
required, the matter is handed over to agencies with appropriate
legal powers (the courts, public prosecutors, police) which decide
100
independently what action is justified.”
This organization of intelligence agencies has a substantial
system of parliamentary checks, even though the agencies
themselves are located within the executive branch.
The
Parliamentary Control Commission consists of nine members
from the lower house of the parliament, five elected from within
101
the governing coalition, and four elected from the opposition.
The chairmanship of the committee rotates at six month intervals
102
The
between the government and opposition parties.
government must report all intelligence activities to this
committee which must itself report to the Bundestag once every
103
two years. The committee has access to a substantial amount of
classified information that is excised from its required public
reports.
In addition to the Parliamentary Control Commission, there
are two committees that were required under the controversial
amendments to Article 10 of the Constitution, which protects
privacy of communications.
These committees review
surveillance practices of both the intelligence services and the
police. The G-10 Gremium (named in honor of Article 10 of the
Constitution) consists of nine members of the Bundestag. It
meets every six months to review and direct general policies
about interception of mail, wiretaps and other forms of electronic
104
intercepts.
The G-10 Commission consists of four legal experts
99. [Federal Constitution Protection Law] (BVerfSchG), supra note 98.
100. Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Tasks, Organization and Working
Methods, at http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/info/bfv/bfv_engl.htm (last visited May
12, 2004).
101. Shpiro, Parliament, Media and Control of the Intelligence Services in
Germany, supra note 91, at 298.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 300.
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(and four alternates) who are nominated by their political parties
and meet together with representatives from the intelligence
105
This group reviews the legality
services about once per month.
of each domestic communications intercept and has the right to
suspend any individual intercept if it appears that the evidence
106
sustaining it is weak or if the intercept infringes any law.
The
committee even reviews the list of “hit words” that computers use
in strategic surveillance to determine which specific
107
conversations to turn over for human attention.
In addition to
these ways of reviewing surveillance strategies, there is also the
permanent possibility for the Parliament to set up a special
investigating committee if any particular surveillance practice
108
generates concern.
Outside of the parliamentary mechanisms, the press in
Germany enjoys substantial constitutional and statutory
protection to investigate intelligence and policing practices. Not
109
only is press freedom guaranteed in the Constitution, but there
110
By
is an explicit constitutional prohibition on censorship.
statute, the press is guaranteed confidentiality of sources and
informants, as well as immunity from police eavesdropping and
111
searches of editorial offices.
As a result, media coverage of the
police and intelligence services is quite common, detailed, and
critical. And because the intelligence services have not been
112
scandal-free, this media check has been quite useful.
With this background, we can assess the changes made to
Germany’s security laws after September 11. The “first security
105. Shpiro, Parliament, Media and Control of the Intelligence Services in
Germany, supra note 91, at 301.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 301-02.
108. Two separate parliamentary committees are charged with overseeing the
budgets of the intelligence agencies, and the books of the agencies can be reviewed as
well by a select group within the Federal Audit Office. Id. at 302-04.
109. Article 5 [Expression]
(1) Everyone has the right to freely express and disseminate his opinion in
speech, writing, and pictures and to freely inform himself from generally
accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of
broadcasts and films are guaranteed. There may be no censorship.

GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 5(1) (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at
19.
110. Id.
111. Shpiro, Parliament, Media and Control of the Intelligence Services in
Germany, supra note 91, at 306.
112. Id. at 305-08.
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package,” sent to the parliament by the German cabinet on
September 19, 2001, modified the criminal code, among other
113
The criminal code was amended to punish creation of
things.
terrorist organizations, including foreign organizations for the
first time. The amendments also forbid any participation in a
criminal organization on German territory, even if the planned
114
criminal acts were to take place outside of Germany.
In
addition, the first security package eliminated the previous
exemption from criminal prosecution of extremist organizations
115
that had a religious basis.
Now extremist religious
organizations can be prohibited on the same basis as other
extremist groups. Finally, the first security package increased
116
security checks for airport personnel.
Most of these provisions
were uncontroversial when passed and, coming as they did before
either Security Council Resolution 1373 or the European
Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, they could be
explicit responses to neither of them.
It is the “second security package” that should interest us
because its provisions were primarily directed at the earlier
117
detection of terrorist threats.
And the second security package
118
Most of the
was by far the more controversial in Germany.
provisions seem to have been a response to the UN Security
Council resolution, something that can be seen not only from
their concrete content, but because they came into effect on
January 1, 2002, the deadline set out in the Security Council
resolution.
But the provisions passed only after fierce
parliamentary debate that resulted in a weakening of a number
of its central provisions. Even so, the second security package
amended “nearly one hundred regulations in seventeen different
119
statutes and five statutory orders.”
The main provisions of the second security package
increased the responsibilities and powers of the security agencies.
113. Lepsius, supra note 44, at *5.
114. Id. This last addition simply brought the German criminal code into line with
what EU member states had obliged themselves to do by an agreement in December
1998. Id.
115. Id. at *6.
116. Id. at *5-6.
117. Id. at *6, *10-17. The “‘second security package’ has also been termed the
counter-terrorism law.” Id. at *10.
118. See Lepsius, supra note 44, at *6.
119. Id. at *6.
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The BfV, the BND, and the MAD were given the power to
demand financial information about individuals from banks and
other financial institutions, as well as from post offices,
telecommunications companies and airlines, after having proved
to a court the specific suspicion of terrorist activity that grounded
122
the request.
Those whose information has been turned over to
the security authorities must not be notified that this exchange of
123
In addition, the BfV’s jurisdiction was
data has occurred.
enlarged to enable it to gather information on organizations and
individuals who “disturb the international understanding or
peaceful cohabitation of peoples,” the first time that the BfV had
been given authority to investigate anything other than purely
124
domestic organizations.
The various federal agencies
responsible for tracking foreigners were given more powers to set
up a central database containing a variety of personal
information, including fingerprints, religious identification and
the results of “language identity tests” designed to uncover the
125
country of origin of an alien.
Police and security agencies were
then given relatively unfettered access to this database. “Grid
126
searches” (or what Americans might call computer profiles)
were given statutory approval and some government ministries
with relevant personal information in their files were required to

120. Because the BND’s jurisdiction is entirely focused on foreigners, this provision
has to be intended to allow the BND access to information that is held within
Germany about foreigners (for example, their bank accounts).
121. MAD’s jurisdiction extends only to those in the military, so this information
could pertain only to those within its ambit.
122. Lepsius, supra note 44, at *10-11.
123. Id. at *11.
124. Id. at *12.
125. Id. at *11.
126. Grid searches try to narrow down a group of suspects from a variety of
demographic and personal data —say, on religion, age, sex, area of residence and
immigration status. The objection to them typically is that someone falls into the
category of suspicion not because of a reason that is particular to the person, but
instead because that person shares with those who might be reasonably suspected a
certain abstract characteristic. The Federal Constitutional Court, in the Case of
Professor Dr. K, Judgment of 14 July 1999, BVerfGE 100, 313, discussed the problem
of individuated suspicion and indicated that the standards for disseminating, storing
and using information obtained in such a way had to be higher than if the
information had been collected based on individuated suspicion. But the Court did
not shut the door on such practices so it is unclear whether the Court would find grid
searches similarly acceptable, if used within clear limits. A translation of the case is
on file with the Loyola Law Review. See also Lepsius, supra note 44, at *15
(discussing the Court’s decision).
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127

New identity cards for
give this information to the BKA.
Germans are now authorized to include biometric data like
128
fingerprints.
The second security package also authorized both
greater protection of sensitive sites like power stations and the
129
use of air marshals in airline security.
The constitutional and rights-protection worries about the
second security package center on three concerns. The first worry
is the increased coordination allowed between the security
services and the police, though this is limited to informationsharing based on strong showings of relevance to particular
investigations and is not a blanket approval of anything like joint
130
This level of information-sharing was clearly
investigations.
encouraged both by the Security Council resolution and by the
European Union anti-terrorism measures taken after September
11. Both sets of external measures encouraged the increase
information-sharing across state borders so that security services
131
and police would have access to terrorism-relevant information.
Much criticism of the second security package focuses on the way
in which this information-sharing undermines the strict
separation of security and police agencies, which had been
132
characteristic of post-war German public law.
The first worry is connected to a second —that the
information collected in terrorism investigations can be stored for
longer periods of time in databases with broader rules of access
than has been customarily allowed in German law. European
data privacy laws in general, and German laws in particular,
confer protection far greater than anything Americans may
expect on personal data, and the idea that personal information
may be collected and stored for a period of months without an
127. Grid searches had been used to apprehend members of the Red Army Faction,
a domestic terrorist group operating in Germany in the 1970s. While this practice
was used on occasion before the second security package, the legitimacy of grid
searches had not been definitively established. See Klaus Jansen, Fighting Terror in
Germany (Am. Inst. for Contemporary German Studies Working Paper 2003)
(discussing the German legal framework in Germany with reference to terrorism),
available at http://www.aicgs.org/publications/PDF/jansen.pdf (last visited May 13,
2004).
128. Lepsius, supra note 44, at *7.
129. Id.
130. See id. at *9-10.
131. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 11; Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism,
supra note 31.
132. Lepsius, supra note 44, at *10.
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individual’s knowledge sets off alarm bells in a privacy-sensitive
public. In addition to lowering barriers between police and
security agencies, data storage also represents an independent
intrusion into the privacy of individual life. But these provisions
also were responses to both Security Council and EU instructions,
which saw database improvement as an important way to combat
133
terrorism.
Finally, there is a concern over the “de-individuation” of
134
suspicion.
German criminal procedure has typically required
that information collection about particular suspects as well as
their arrest and detention rely solely on reasonable suspicion that
can be tied to incriminating evidence about that person in
135
particular.
The codification of grid searches and the
criminalization of mere membership in terrorist organizations
appears to weaken this requirement that proof be obtained in an
individualized way. To the critics, mere association or the
coincidence of correlating characteristics with terrorists appears
now to be sufficient for the authorities to open a dossier and to
136
eventually arrest and detain a suspect.
This is a tremendous
cause for concern in Germany which has generally required high
and individuated standards of proof before surveillance or
investigations can be undertaken.
Still, in international comparison, the changes made by the
post-September 11 security packages in Germany seem like
modest measures in comparison with the British post-September137
11 anti-terrorism law, but they set off a storm of protest and
had to be substantially softened before they could pass through
138
Most of the expansion of the
the German Parliament.
133. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 11; Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism,
supra note 31.
134. See Lepsius, supra note 44, at *13-17 (referring to changes in the law that
allow a person to be the subject of security measures without being concretely
suspected of any particular offense). Examples of this include random identity
checks, general monitoring of international radio telephone traffic, and data-mining
grid searches based on association with certain social groups or possession of certain
abstract characteristics, none of which require that the target of the measures be
specifically suspected of having done anything wrong. Id.
135. Id. at *14.
136. See id. at *16-17 (noting that District Courts in Wiesbaden and Berlin as well
as the Court of Appeal in Dusseldorf have questioned the constitutionality of grid
searches).
137. See infra Part III.B.
138. Lepsius, supra note 44, at *22-25 (discussing the adoption of the “second
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intelligence services’ powers is limited by a sunset provision in
the second security package that will automatically take effect in
139
The structural protections against abuse of these
five years.
powers —Parliamentary review, G-10 review and ordinary
judicial as well as Constitutional Court review —remain in place.
There are a number of signs that the courts in Germany are
resisting some of the most worrisome aspects of the new postSeptember 11 laws, aggressively affirming that September 11
140
Two
cannot cause Germany to lose its human rights bearings.
men were charged with participation in the Hamburg cell of al
Qaeda that planned the September 11 attacks. They were tried
141
in Germany’s ordinary courts.
The first defendant, Mounir El
Motassadeq, was convicted of more than 3,000 counts of accessory
142
to murder.
The second defendant, Abdelghani Mzoudi, was
nearly convicted on similar charges before the case against him
fell apart when the state could not produce potentially
143
exculpatory evidence requested by the judge. In both cases, the
American government refused to provide the German government
with information acquired as a result of the interrogation of
Ramzi bin al Shibh, a man who had personally taken credit for
144
plotting the September 11 attacks and who was in US custody.
Eventually, the conviction of Motassadeq was quashed and the
145
case sent back for trial. In both cases, German courts refused to
convict if potentially exculpatory evidence were withheld in
violation of German law.
Then, in a case whose facts date from before September 11,
the Federal Constitutional Court ruled on March 3, 2004 that a

security package” in Parliament).
139. Lepsius, supra note 44, at *7.
140. See id. at *16-17 (discussing various decisions holding parts of the antiterrorism surveillance laws unconstitutional).
141. Richard Bernstein, Germans Blame U.S. for Qaeda Acquittal; Americans
Refused to Supply Evidence, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 7, 2004, at 3.
142. Id.; Peter Finn, Moroccan Convicted in Sept. 11 Attacks; German Court
Delivers Maximum Sentence for Aiding Hamburg Cell, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2003, at
A1.
143. Bernstein, supra note 141, at 3; John Burgess, Verdict Postponed in German
9/11 Case; Prosecution Claims Eleventh Hour Evidence Against Moroccan Defendant,
WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2004, at A22.
144. John Burgess, German Court Orders New Trial for 9/11 Suspect, WASH. POST,
Mar. 5, 2004, at A16.
145. Luke Harding, First and Only 9/11 Conviction Overturned by German Court,
GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 5, 2004, at 17.
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federal law passed pursuant to the 1998 constitutional
amendment allowing electronic surveillance of the home was
146
The majority agreed that the statute had
unconstitutional.
intruded too far upon the inviolability of the home by allowing
surveillance of private conversations among family members and
between the target of the surveillance and his or her lawyer,
147
doctor, or clergyperson.
Moreover, the statute had not
sufficiently required there to be “concrete evidence of a crime”
before the surveillance could be authorized. The statute had also
failed to specify that the underlying crime had to be serious
enough to warrant at least five years in prison before intrusive
148
surveillance could be used at all. The limitations that the Court
placed on the government were so severe that it is unlikely
electronic surveillance of homes can be used at all in the future.
These two indications— that ordinary courts would not convict
without all of the evidence and that the Constitutional Court
would insist on upholding personal privacy against security
interests — indicate that Germany has not fallen into a state of
emergency after September 11, even as it has tried to comply
with the new international law.
B. THE UNITED KINGDOM
Britain’s constitutional structure could hardly be more
different from that of Germany’s. Britain has a constitutional
government without a written constitution. In general, Britain’s
unwritten constitution has been characterized by a high degree of
continuity, by contrast with the repeated political collapses that
have led to new constitutions in Germany’s past. This continuity
persists to the point where the present British Constitution
149
consists of very ancient and very modern rules mixed together.
Perhaps the most important principle of the contemporary British
Constitution is parliamentary supremacy, which tends to work at
cross-purposes with the claim of an ancient constitution, because
146. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 1 BvR 2378/98 v. 3.3.2004, available at
http://www.bverfg.de/cgi-bin/link.pl?aktuell (last visited May 13, 2004); German
Court Attacks Law on Bugging Criminal, Terror Suspects, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
March 3, 2004.
147. BVerfG, 1 BvR 2378/98 v. 3.3.2004.
148. Id.
149. As of 1995, “constitutional law” in the volumes labeled as such and published
by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, contained the text of 138 Acts of Parliament and
the human rights volumes added another 32 Acts. But whether all of these laws are
really constitutional or not is a lively subject of scholarly debate.
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a single valid vote of that constitutional entity known as the
150
Queen-in-Parliament, is enough to change even long-standing
constitutional norms. Compared with Germany, where legal
clarity is considered an important constitutional value in and of
itself, Britain’s constitution is less than clear.
As some
influential constitutional commentators have remarked, the
British Constitution is “indeterminate, indistinct, and
151
unentrenched.”
An intensely debated legal puzzle has been created by the
European Union. By entering the European Community in 1973,
Britain committed itself to the principle that community law is
152
supreme over domestic law in those areas where it operates. As
a result, presumably there are some parts of British law,
including some of its constitutional laws, which now cannot be
153
changed with a single vote of the parliament. But, this has not
yet fully been taken on board in British constitutional theory.
Moreover, Britain is a common law country with a long history of
valid judge-made law existing beyond the edges of statutory
enactments. In Britain, as a result, there is a debate, familiar to
Americans but quite foreign to Germans, over the extent to which
any statute has been modified by court interpretation, or indeed
about the extent to which one court decision has modified,
supplanted, or nullified another. This applies to constitutional
laws, as well as to any other. In short, the British Constitution is
a complex, continuing, and amorphous entity but it can be
changed root and branch overnight. And, indeed, in recent years
154
it has been.

150. The Queen-in-Parliament is typically constituted by a majority vote of both
houses of parliament and nominal assent of the Queen, though under certain
circumstances, the House of Lords, the upper house of the British parliament, can be
bypassed in this process. The monarch last vetoed a law in 1707, which makes the
non-assent of the Queen a practical impossibility. As a result, the House of
Commons, led by the government it elects, has practical control of all constitutional
matters.
151. S.E. FINER ET AL., COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS 40 (1995).
152. See David Jenkins, From Unwritten to Written: Transformation in the British
Common-Law Constitution, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 863, 953-55 (2003)
(discussing the supremacy of Community law under the European Communities Act).
153. Id.
154. Britain has seen a great deal of constitutional change in the last few years: the
devolution of parliamentary authority to Scotland and Wales, the abolition of
hereditary peerage in the House of Lords as well as the substantial reduction of the
number of life peers who can serve as members, the introduction of limited judicial
review through the Human Rights Act of 1998 that formally incorporated much of
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Crises like the September 11 terrorist attacks, which were
sharply felt in Britain, have the potential to create radical
changes in a short time without many constitutional circuit
breakers to stop the surge of panic. Critics claim that this is
exactly what has happened when the British Anti-Terrorism,
155
Crime and Security Act of 2001 was passed quickly in the fall of
156
But before reviewing recent British terrorism laws, it
2001.
should first be established what controls on policing and
intelligence were in place prior to the new laws because the new
laws can only be understood against the background of existing
practices.
Like the British Constitution itself, the specific mandates
and separation of functions between the security and police
agencies of Britain was— from their origins and continuing to the
157
present day —indeterminate, indistinct, and unentrenched.
Local police departments in Britain, originally too small and with
too few powers to do much damage, have grown into large
bureaucracies with ever-increasing powers of surveillance. The
police have themselves been policed (or not, as the case may be)
primarily through various evidentiary exclusionary rules enforced
by judges when cases come to trial. These rules include a ban on
forced confessions, but the same judges that have enforced this
exclusionary rule traditionally permitted admission of other
158
information gathered through police overreaching. However, as
with all common-law-like criminal procedure, a great deal of caseby-case specificity in these determinations has made it difficult to
the European Convention on Human Rights into British law, but which only came
into effect in October 2000. Most recently, the government has floated a proposal to
abolish the position of Lord Chancellor, a position which united the parliament and
the executive with the judiciary, and to replace this post with a Secretary for
Constitutional Affairs, who has the powers of an ordinary minister.
155. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 27 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm (last visited June
19, 2004).
156. The only substantial barrier in the way of passing the bill was the opposition
of the House of Lords, which was overcome within a few days by a government
reversal on the provision that would have criminalized inciting religious hatred. See
Chronology of Home Secretary’s Battle Over Anti-Terrorism Bill, TIMES (London),
December 15, 2001.
157. Peter Gill, Security and Intelligence Services in the United Kingdom, in
DEMOCRACY, LAW AND SECURITY: INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICES IN CONTEMPORARY
EUROPE, supra note 91, at 267.
158. Kuk Cho, Reconstruction of the English Criminal Justice System and its
Reinvigorated Exclusionary Rules, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 259, 265-67
(1999).
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elucidate general policies that police could follow as bright-line
rules. They got away with aggressive policing often enough to
keep it up.
In general, the surveillance procedures used by both police
and security services were governed by no discernible legal
regime at all (unless one counts unpublished guidelines of the
Home Office as a legal regime) until the passage of the 1985
159
Interception of Communications Act.
This Act permitted both
police and the security services to engage in telephone tapping,
mail opening, and electronic communications interception
through a “warrant” issued by the Secretary of State on any of the
following grounds: “(a) in the interests of national security; (b) for
the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime; or (c) for the
purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United
160
Kingdom.” The Act has been widely criticized for failing to have
any separation of powers check in the warrant procedure, since
only the executive branch authorizes and executes such
161
warrants.
In addition, the Act has been criticized for failing to
have any criteria capable of clear delineation for issuing these
162
warrants.
Historically, when there have been domestic disturbances in
Britain, police departments have created “special branches”
which could, without much additional guidance, investigate these
threats both as crimes and for intelligence purposes. The first
such special branch was created as part of the Metropolitan
Police in 1883 during a wave of Irish Nationalist terrorist
163
bombings in London. Other police departments followed suit.
These special branches were largely unregulated until 1970,
when the Home Office issued unpublished guidelines on special
branch activities, and then revised and published guidelines in
1984 in response to a parliamentary inquiry into domestic

159. Interception of Communications Act of 1985, ch. 56 (Eng.), available at
http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm47/4778/4778.htm
(last
visited June 19, 2004).
160. Id. c. 56, § 1(2)a.
161. J.R. Spencer, The Case for a Code of Criminal Procedure, CRIM. L. REV. 2000,
July, 519, 522-23. See also Simon A. Price, The Interception of Communications Act
1985: An Examination of the Government’s Proposals for Reform, COMPUTER &
TELECOM. L. REV. 1999, 5(6), 163, 163-64 (discussing proposed amendments to the
law).
162. Spencer, supra note 161, at 522-23.
163. Gill, supra note 157, at 268.
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164

Only then was it possible for the
intelligence institutions.
public to see what the special branches were tasked with doing.
165
This turned out to be primarily “defending the realm”
in
regards to espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and subversion. This
broad, lightly defined mission has routinely enabled these police
units to engage in surveillance of a great deal of legal political
activity and virtually anything else that in the police’s view might
constitute a threat. In 1994, revised guidelines were issued, but
they did not change this vague and egregious assignment of
166
powers.
The intelligence agencies were similarly governed quite
casually. Both MI5 (the domestic security agency) and MI6 (the
foreign security agency, more properly called the Secret
Intelligence Service, or SIS) were established in 1909 when there
167
was a German spy scare that panicked government officials.
The intelligence agency that collects foreign electronic intercepts,
or signals intelligence, is the Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ), which started for obvious reasons during
168
World War I. The intelligence unit for the military services, the
Defense Intelligence Staff (DIS), was started during the 1960s
when the intelligence services of the various military commands
169
were unified in a wave of military reform.
Foreign-, signalsand military-intelligence information are routinely reported to
the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) which, since its founding
in 1936, has analyzed this information and reported it to relevant
170
government officials for use in policymaking.
Since 1957, the
JIC has been part of the Cabinet Office.
In general, the JIC gives assignments to the foreign-,
signals- and military-intelligence agencies, instructing them in

164. Gill, supra note 157, at 269.
165. Home Office Guidelines on the Work of a Special Branch, 1984, para. 6,
available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/mar/special-branch-1984.htm.
166. A summary of the main points in the 1994 guidelines can be found at
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/mar/special-branch-1995.htm. As this article
was going to press, new guidelines were issued by the Home Office in March 2004.
Guidelines on Special Branch Work in the United Kingdom. They can be found at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs3/special_branch.pdf.
167. Gill, supra note 157, at 265, 267; A Brief History of the Security Service, at
http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page120.html (last visited May 13, 2004).
168. Gill, supra note 157, at 267.
169. Id. at 267-68.
170. Id. at 268.
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171

But the control of MI5 is
what the policymakers need to know.
172
less structured. As a result, MI5 has been largely “self tasking.”
MI5 didn’t even have a statutory basis for its existence until
173
1989.
The first mandate for MI5 was written by the Home Office in
1945 but never published; another directive from the Home Office
was issued in 1952, but it too was not published until a judicial
inquiry released it more than a decade later in its report on a
174
security scandal.
This was the first time that the public could
see that MI5’s charge was essentially the same “defense of the
realm” language that had controlled the special branches of the
police —a mandate highly subject to abuse. MI5 did not get full
statutory authorization until the passage of the Security Service
175
Act of 1989, and then only because Britain rightly feared that
its minimal human rights guarantees surrounding surveillance
would be found wanting by the European Court of Human
176
Rights.
The Security Service Act now gives MI5 jurisdiction
over “national security,” as opposed to “defense of the realm.” But
the vague term “national security” covers issues like espionage,
terrorism, sabotage, and subversion, the very same tasks that
used to appear under the heading of “defense of the realm.” The
171. Gill, supra note 157, at 270.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 270-71.
175. Id. at 271. Security Service Act 1989, c. 5, available at http://www.legislation.
hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1989/Ukpga_19890005_en_1.htm.
176. Even with the passage of the Security Service Act, the European Court of
Human Rights continued to find Britain’s surveillance practices to be insufficiently
regulated. The major decisions finding that Britain violated Article 8 of the
European Convention of Human Rights through police violation of individuals’ rights
of personal privacy are Malone v. UK, [1984] ECHR 8691/79 (Feb. 8, 1984), Halford
v. UK, (1997) 3 BHRC 31 (June 25, 1997), Khan v. UK, (2000) 8 BHRC 10 (May 12,
2000), P.G. & J.H. v. UK [2001] ECHR 44787/98 (Sept. 25, 2001), Armstrong v. UK
[2002] ECHR 48521/99 (July 16, 2002). Taylor-Sabori v. UK, [2002] ECHR 47114/99
(Oct. 22, 2002), Allan v. UK [2002] ECHR 48539/99 (Nov. 5, 2002), Chalkley v. UK
[2003] ECHR 63831/00 (June 12, 2003), Perry v. UK [2003] ECHR 63737/00 (July 17,
2003); Lewis v. UK [2003] ECHR 1303/02 (Nov. 25, 2003). Significantly, the number
of ruling against Britain accelerated after September 11, 2001, though all of these
rulings to date judge practices under the law before Britain introduced the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) of 2000, ch. 23, available at
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000023.htm or the various anti-terrorism
laws. RIPA has been taken note of by the court (in Allan v. United Kingdom [2002]),
but the court has not yet had an opportunity to rule on facts arising under that law
nor under the post-September 11 anti-terrorism law that takes many of those
protections back.
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statute adds to the old mandate the new task that MI5 can take
on investigation of threats to the “economic well-being of the
177
Rather than constraining MI5’s mandate, the Security
UK.”
Service Act seems to have expanded it without making it a great
deal clearer, or more rights-protective. And the mandate has
since been expanded even further.
In 1992, MI5 took
responsibility for countering the paramilitary groups in Northern
Ireland, a lead role it took away from the special branch of the
178
Royal Ulster Constabulary.
In 1996, the Security Service Act
was amended to increase MI5’s role in the “prevention and
179
detection of serious crime.”
What controls are there over these processes? Until the
Human Rights Act of 1998 went into effect in October 2000,
British judges relied upon their understanding of the common
law in assessing whether evidence gathered through various
180
intrusive methods would be admissible at trial.
If cases never
went to trial, there was little practical review available for
individuals who might claim their rights were violated; even if a
case did go to trial, it was far from certain that, absent the
constitutional status of defendants’ rights, judges would accord
them pride of place. Still there was a sense that the historic
rights of Englishmen included some defendants’ rights. Venerable
though such rights may have seemed, however, they have been
vanishing through statutory intervention. For example, the
British government in 1994 abolished the right to remain silent
and, more recently, the Blair government pushed through the
Parliament the abolition of the rule against being tried twice for
181
the same offense.
177. Gill, supra note 157, at 271.
178. Id. at 272, 277.
179. Id. at 277.
180. For example, the right to remain silent was established as a result of Star
Chambers abuses in the late seventeenth century when criminal cases were moved to
common-law courts. But since in the common law of that time defendants were
presumed incompetent to testify, the right gradually atrophied because it was never
invoked. The right to remain silent was restored formally again only in the late
nineteenth century, along with the prohibition against adverse inferences from
silence. Abusive police practices were not considered until the rise of formal police
departments in the early twentieth century, but judges were not particularly keen to
inquire into how the police had treated a suspect in order to obtain his evidence.
Carol A. Chase, Hearing the “Sounds of Silence” in Criminal Trials: A Look at Recent
British Law Reforms With an Eye Toward Reforming the American Criminal Justice
System, 44 KAN. L. REV. 929, 933-38 (1996).
181. On the right to remain silent, id. at 937-42. On the Blair government’s
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Parliamentary controls over general intelligence policy have
theoretically ensured that the security services stay within
bounds. This review, however, generally has worked only over
the foreign security services, only recently and only sporadically.
In 1965, a Security Commission was established to review the
intelligence agencies, but since it had to be convened by the
Prime Minister who was typically making use of the intelligence
182
products at the time, it rarely met.
The system was revised in
the Security Service Act of 1989, through which the security
services were to be kept in check by a commissioner and a
183
tribunal.
The tribunal consists of three lawyers who are
empowered to determine whether individual public complaints
184
about improper surveillance are warranted.
The commissioner
has the power to determine whether the surveillance warrants
issued by the Secretary of State have complied with procedures
185
outlined in the Act.
In the first decade that the system
operated, about two hundred complaints were filed but none were
186
upheld.
One might therefore be forgiven for thinking that the
system did not seem to provide effective oversight. A later act,
the Intelligence Services Act of 1994, set MI6 (SIS) and the
GCHQ on a firm statutory basis (similar to what the 1989 act did

abolition of the double jeopardy rule, see Robert L. Weinberg, Try, Try Again: If at
First They Don’t Succeed, Criminal Prosecutions in England Now Get a Second
Chance, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 16, 2004, at 52. The European Convention on Human
Rights may permit the abolition of double jeopardy in the way the British did it —
which is to permit the reopening of a case only upon the discovery of substantially
new evidence. See Protocol No. 7, art. 4:
Article 4 – Right not to be tried or punished twice
1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings
under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already
been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal
procedure of that State.
2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the reopening of
the case in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State concerned,
if there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a
fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome
of the case.
3. No derogation from this Article shall be made under Article 15 of the
Convention.

Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights, November 22, 1984.
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf.
182. Gill, supra note 157, at 282-83.
183. Id. at 283.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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187

This act also created the Intelligence and Security
for MI5).
Committee (ISC) of the Parliament with the jurisdiction to review
188
all of the intelligence agencies. Despite some difficulties getting
access to information, the Intelligence and Security Committee
189
has been quite active in reviewing the intelligence services.
The increasing boldness of the ISC shows some signs of exercising
true separation-of-powers control over the intelligence agencies
190
for the first time.
Of course, Britain’s experience with domestic surveillance
grows out of its experience in Northern Ireland. Northern
Ireland has been dealt with simultaneously as a policing problem
managed through the special branch of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary, as a domestic security problem managed through
MI5 and also as a military problem that involved calling in the
191
In addition, because of terrorist attacks in
British Army.
London and other cities within England, controlling domestic
terrorism outside of Northern Ireland has been a task shared by
various special branches of local police forces operating closely
192
with MI5.
Many of the special anti-terrorism laws that
preceded the general codification in 2000 had applied only in
Northern Ireland. But the effects of these special terrorism laws
spread to criminal law and criminal procedure generally within
Northern Ireland and the bombings outside of Northern Ireland
caused separate terrorism laws to be passed that applied to the
193
rest of Britain. In short, the effects of the “special laws” spread.
The special regime of legal regulation started with a bifurcation
between the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of
1973 which made unique rules for Northern Ireland and the more
general Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974 which set forth legal
194
Various updates and
procedures for the rest of the UK.

187. Gill, supra note 157, at 284.
188. Id. at 284.
189. Most recently, it played an important role in reviewing the intelligence basis
on which the British government went to war with Iraq in spring 2003. See Paul
Waugh and Kim Sengupta, The ISC Report: Intelligence Worries Vindicated As MPs
Put Dossier Under the Microscope, INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 12, 2003, at 4.
190. See Gill, supra note 157, at 285 (expressing optimism with the future of the
ISC).
191. See id. at 272 (describing the intelligence agency structure in Northern
Ireland).
192. Id. at 272-73.
193. Id. at 273.
194. The anti-terrorism campaign in Northern Ireland had a dire effect on criminal
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amendments to these two acts have been in effect ever since. The
new fight against terrorism after September 11, with its focus on
radical Islamist groups operating both domestically and from
foreign bases, has been fought on terrain largely mapped out for
another purpose.
As this brief review indicates, policing functions and
intelligence functions have been mixed together in the history of
British security policy and until recently none of them has had
either an explicit statutory basis or substantial external review.
There has been no clear division of labor between police and
intelligence agencies (in fact, MI5 has always worked closely with
the special branches of the various police forces), and no clear
division between domestic and foreign responsibilities (police spy
on foreign groups resident in Britain; the army participated with
MI5 and the police in Northern Ireland). As demonstrated below,
the main impetus to the reform that had been accomplished
before September 11 has been the persistently negative
judgments of British practice on the part of the European Court
of Human Rights.
The Terrorism Act 2000, initiated when Tony Blair’s Labour
government came to power in the 1990s, began as a goodgovernment measure. At a time when Britain was experiencing
less domestic terrorism than it had in decades, the Labour
government (which had also engineered the passage of the
Human Rights Act) attempted to codify Britain’s myriad of
crisscrossing and conflicting anti-terrorism statutes into one code
195
that would meet human rights standards. The “special regime”
that applied to Northern Ireland through the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provision) Acts was to be softened. Then, it would be

law and criminal process in Northern Ireland generally outside the field of terrorism.
Peter G. Eikenberry et al., Northern Ireland: A Report to the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York From a Mission of the Committee on International Human
Rights, 54 THE RECORD 426 (1999). Through most of the time that the Irish
Republican Army conducted a campaign involving violence in both Northern Ireland
and in the United Kingdom outside Northern Ireland proper, two different legal
regimes were introduced for dealing with terrorism offenses. These two regimes
magnified differences between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK, among other
things because the UK would banish suspected terrorists back to Northern Ireland
where they could be dealt with more harshly under a different legal regime. For a
history of the two separate systems of terrorism laws in Britain, see Fionnuala Ni
Aolain, The Fortification of an Emergency Regime, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1353 (1996).
195. Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.hmso.
gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000011.htm (last visited May 13, 2004).
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combined with relevant bits of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts
that applied elsewhere in Britain and made into law that applied
to the whole of the UK, thereby avoiding the need for special
196
In fact, one of
measures justifiable only in extreme situations.
the stated goals of the codification was enabling Britain to
withdraw from its derogation under Article 15 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) with respect to police
197
detention powers governed by Article 5.
Britain removed its
derogation when the Terrorism Act 2000 came into force in early
2001. But then September 11 occurred. The 2000 statute was so
closely followed by the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act

196. When the European Court of Human Rights considered Britain’s use of
“special powers” in Northern Ireland, it initially approved them precisely because of
the dire situation that held sway in the North:
Unquestionably, the exercise of the special powers was mainly, and before 5
February 1973 even exclusively, directed against the IRA as an underground
military force. The intention was to combat an organisation which had played a
considerable subversive role throughout the recent history of Ireland and which
was creating, in August 1971 and thereafter, a particularly far-reaching and
acute danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions
of the six counties and the lives of the province’s inhabitants. Being confronted
with a massive wave of violence and intimidation, the Northern Ireland
Government and then, after the introduction of direct rule (30 March 1972), the
British Government were reasonably entitled to consider that normal legislation
offered insufficient resources for the campaign against terrorism and that
recourse to measures outside the scope of the ordinary law, in the shape of
extrajudicial deprivation of liberty, was called for.

Ireland v. United Kingdom, (1980) 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, [1978] ECHR 5310/71, para.
212.
Allowing this special legislation by according to Britain a “margin of appreciation”
within which it could act, the Court’s reasoning also made it clear that only such an
extreme situation would justify special legislation of this sort.
197. WALKER, supra note 42, at xi. Pursuant to Article 15 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, states are allowed to derogate from their obligations
under specific provisions of the Convention by making up-front declarations of both
their reasons for doing so and the specific articles from which they want to derogate.
Such derogations are allowed only “in time of war or other public emergency” and
only “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.” Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for
signature, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 46, 50, 53, E.T.S. No. 5, [hereinafter European
Convention
on
Human
Rights
or
ECHR],
available
at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm. The European Court of
Human Rights reserved the power to review whether the reasons for derogation are
sufficient and whether the derogations are narrowly crafted to serve legitimate
purposes. For a recent example of the Court’s thinking on these question see Ozkan
v. Turkey, [2004] ECHR 21689/93 (reiterating from which provisions of the European
Convention it was not possible to derogate under any circumstances and also judging
the acceptability of particular practices used in what the respondent country had
claimed was a state of emergency).
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198

2001 (ATCS) and its new derogation from Article 5 of the ECHR
that the new period of non-derogation seemed merely a
continuation of the previous one.
The two anti-terrorism laws are enormous (together
199
consisting of 250 pages of small type), and so it is impossible to
go into all of their details. The Terrorism Act 2000 includes a
new, broad definition of terrorism; substantial sections on
proscribed organizations and the methods of their proscription; a
section on terrorist property, including prohibitions on fund
raising and support for terrorist causes, as well as provisions for
seizing money used for such purposes; and intricate regulations of
200
terrorist investigations and counter-terrorism powers.
There is
a still separate section for provisions applying only in Northern
Ireland even though most of the law now applies everywhere in
201
the UK. And, there are a number of general and miscellaneous
provisions that create new crimes (weapons training, incitement
to terrorism, bombing and terrorism financing) and give guidance
for when the police may use “reasonable force” in terrorism
202
investigations as well as indicating when they may stop and
203
search both terrorism-related suspects and containers.
The 2000 law was praised for deleting a number of notable
violations against human rights that had existed in previous
legislation— the power to issue “exclusion orders” (which typically
removed terrorism suspects from Britain back to Northern
Ireland), the power to intern suspects indefinitely without trial
(which was an important cause of the ECHR Article 5 derogation,
even though the power had not been used since 1975), and the
criminalization of withholding information from terrorism
investigations (which had been used to jail those who seemed to
be collaborating with the Irish Republican Army and other
terrorist groups by remaining silent about their activities). Some
of these much-hated provisions reemerged in the 2001 antiterrorism law. For now, the focus here will be only on those
provisions that affect investigation and surveillance of suspected
terrorists.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, supra note 155, at c. 24.
WALKER, supra note 42, at 291-541.
Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 195.
Id. §§ 65-80.
Id. § 114.
Id. § 116.
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Under the Terrorism Act 2000, no powers that are given to
the police by common law or by other statutes are diminished; the
powers given to police under the Act are in addition to those given
204
to the police elsewhere.
The 2000 terrorism law adds that, in
terrorism investigations, a constable could search homes upon
getting a warrant from a justice of the peace based on
205
demonstration of “reasonable suspicion.” This codified the trend
toward removing warrant power from the Secretary of State and
internalizing the standard of the European Convention on
Human Rights, which requires individualized and specifiable
suspicion for searches, surveillance, arrests and detention. If a
search involves something other than a private residence —for
example, in an area cordoned off because it poses an immediate
danger —the approval of a police superintendent (or someone of
206
higher rank) would be enough to authorize the search.
For
deliberate seizure and retention of material that might be used as
evidence, approval of a circuit judge is required, but such
material can be taken as a byproduct of the search as long as
acquisition of such materials was not the primary focus going into
207
a search. In addition, a police officer can compel explanations of
seized materials from suspects and witnesses, upon getting an
order from a circuit judge. If there is an emergency, however, a
police superintendent can authorize any of the above searches, as
208
long as notice is made after the fact to the Secretary of State.
Specifically, with regard to Northern Ireland, the Secretary of
State is authorized to issue all of these warrants and orders in
209
lieu of judicial review.
In addition to being able to search places and seize things,
police may be authorized through a disclosure order issued by a
circuit judge in England and Wales (a sheriff in Scotland or a
Crown Court judge in Northern Ireland) to acquire information
from financial institutions pertaining to accounts that may be
relevant to a terrorism investigation. A disclosure order allows
information to be acquired about the identity of account holders,
210
as well as specific transactions on the accounts.
In addition,
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 195, § 114.
Id. § 42.
Id. §§ 33-35.
Id.
Id. § 87.
Id.
Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 195, §§ 15-18.
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public authorities who hold information relevant to a police
investigation (here, the statute is not limited in its wording to
terrorism investigations only) may volunteer this information to
the police (or should turn it over upon being asked), without
211
Such
risking sanction under the Data Protection Act 1998.
information may include details provided under compulsion to
state officials, like income disclosures made for tax purposes.
This provision was first included in the 2000 Act, but the number
of state agencies that must provide information upon request to
212
criminal investigators was increased in the 2001 Act.
The provision of the 2000 anti-terrorism law that caused the
most controversy allows arrest of a terrorism suspect without
requiring the police to first obtain a warrant. Section 41(1) of the
2000 law is quite blunt: “A constable may arrest without warrant
213
a person whom he reasonably suspects to be a terrorist.” There
is no requirement, as there would be for an ordinary arrest, that
there be suspicion of a specific offense that the suspect has
committed or is about to commit. Mere suspicion of being a
terrorist is enough.
This is where the particularly broad
definition of terrorism outlined in the 2000 Act becomes
important— terrorism-related offenses not only include having
committed or having actively planned to carry out a terrorist
attack, but also include various forms of membership, support
and other relatively passive forms of being on the fringes of
214
terrorist groups.
Moreover, when suspects are apprehended under Section 41,
they do not have to be informed of the reasons for detention, as
would be required in a normal arrest. Under Section 41,
detention can last up to forty-eight hours without bringing the
suspect before a judge, but this period is extendable up to five
days depending on a complicated formula for review that depends
upon the circumstances and place of the arrest (different rules
215
apply in Northern Ireland).
A request for an extension of
detention without charges can be made to a judge (different types
of judges are specified for the different parts of the UK) by
someone at the rank of police superintendent or higher. Upon

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 195, §§ 20-21.
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, supra note 155.
Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 195, § 41(1).
Id. § 1.
For more analysis of Section 41, see WALKER, supra note 42, at 119-23.
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such a request, a judge may extend the period of detention for up
216
Combining the original forty-eight
to an additional five days.
hours with the additional five-day extension means that suspects
can be held for an entire week without being charged, or in fact,
without the police ever having to show that there was reasonable
suspicion that the suspect committed or was about to commit any
217
criminal offense.
Another feature of Article 41 that provoked criticism
involved the right to counsel. While detained persons in Britain
generally have the right to counsel from the start of their
detention, such rights may be suspended for terrorism suspects
for up to forty-eight hours under Article 41 upon showing that
providing access to such counsel may interfere with the police’s
ability to gather information about the commission, preparation
or instigation of acts of terrorism or if consultation with counsel
would tip off someone and make it more difficult to prevent an act
218
of terrorism or apprehend other suspects.
For similar reasons,
access to the telephone to notify family members or counsel may
also be denied for up to forty-eight hours. And, when access to
counsel is finally granted, a detainee may be allowed to consult
counsel only within the sight and hearing of an inspector, which
means that the meeting cannot be private.
Criticism of the right-to-counsel provisions centered on the
worry that intrusive and pressured interrogation would occur in
the period before the detainees were allowed to see a lawyer.
Even when a lawyer was allowed to be present, frank
consultation might reveal to the police further evidence to use
against the detainee. The provisions for arrest without warrant
together with the ability of the police to detain suspects and deny
them counsel for forty-eight hours, all before bringing them
216. Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 195, § 41.
217. It was this change in the structure of the detention period that allowed Britain
to withdraw its derogation from Article 5 of the European Convention of Human
Rights. The European Court of Human Rights had held, most saliently in Britain’s
case in Brogan v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) 117 (1988), that the
shortest of the detention periods at issue in that case —four days and six hours —
was too long to comply with Article 5(3), which provides that “Everyone arrested or
detained . . . shall be brought promptly before a judge . . . .” Id. Critics of the 2000
law thought that a week of detention without proof of reasonable suspicion that the
detainee had committed or was about to commit an offense would still run afoul of
European Court of Human Rights’ mandates, regardless of whether or not some of
the detention had been approved by a judge. See WALKER, supra note 42, at 123-24.
218. Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 195, § 41.
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before a judge, present a most unattractive package in human
rights terms. And that was the pre-September-11 law.
The 2001 Act adds provisions that allow the police to take
extraordinary means to identify suspects, including those
arrested without warrant. These extraordinary means, including
fingerprinting and intimate searches to discover birthmarks and
other distinctive bodily markings, can occur without the consent
219
of the person searched. In addition, police are permitted to take
photographs of both the detainee and their distinctive bodily
220
markings.
To aid in identification, police may remove
“disguises” that block a clear view of the suspect’s body,
221
The reference here could be to Islamic
particularly the face.
scarves, the hijab, or other forms of dress that devout Muslim
women wear and that would cause enormous embarrassment and
a sense of being disrespected if removed. Given its potential to be
used for harassment of particular segments of the population,
this provision has come under criticism.
In Section 44 of the 2000 terrorism law, any constable in
uniform is authorized to stop and search both vehicles and
pedestrians, including anything carried by either. A constable
can do this without concrete suspicion of the specific persons or
cars stopped, as long as the place where the stop occurs is
222
specified in an authorization received beforehand.
This section
of the law was designed to handle threats of vehicle bombs in
particular. The authorization to search cars, passengers, and
pedestrians may be given by a police officer who is at the rank of
223
assistant chief constable or higher. The Secretary of State must
be informed of such authorizations, and may cancel any

219. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, supra note 155, §§ 89-91.
220. Id. §§ 92-93.
221. Id. §§ 94-95.
222. Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 195, § 44. This provision has been used in
dramatic ways. For example, the Metropolitan Police Department covering the
London metropolitan area declared its entire jurisdiction a stop-and-search zone for
an entire month in August and September 2003. Michael Paterson, Terror Laws
Used on Arms Protesters, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 11, 2003, at 6. This was
challenged in court both by a journalist, who was trying to cover a demonstration
against an arms-sale fair being held in London, and by one of the demonstrators.
Both had been stopped and searched without any individuated suspicion that they
were involved in criminal activity. The court upheld these searches. R (on the
application of Gillan and another) v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [2003]
EWHC 2545 (Admin), [2003] All ER (D) 526 (Oct), (Approved judgment).
223. Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 195, § 44.
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While this review is better than
authorization if he sees fit.
nothing, it does not have the independence guaranteed by judicial
review. Beyond these powers, the 2001 Act allows the British
Transport Police or the Ministry of Defense to specify places
where vehicles and pedestrians can be stopped for up to twenty225
eight days at a time. Under both the 2000 and 2001 laws, these
authorizations can result in “blanket searches” —that is, searches
carried out without the police having to show reasonable
suspicion that the specific cars or persons searched have any
connection to either terrorism or crime.
The immigration-related sections of the 2001 law have
received the most condemnation and have required that Britain
once again derogate from Article 5 of the European Convention on
Human Rights. Under the post-September 11 law, the Secretary
of State may certify a person as a suspected international
terrorist. The Secretary may do so if he “a) believes that the
person’s presence in the United Kingdom is a risk to national
226
security and b) suspects that the person is a terrorist.”
The
evidentiary basis for such a judgment is not specified in the law.
The effect of such certification is to allow indefinite detention,
227
without trial, of those suspects who are not British subjects.
There is an appeal to the Special Immigration Appeals
Commission (SIAC), which can quash any individual certification
228
that it believes not to be sustainable.
However, since the
statute expressly permits indefinite detention of aliens pending
removal, there is little else the Commission can do once it finds
229
that the Secretary of State meets the low standards.
Under
224. Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 195, § 46.
225. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, supra note 155, § 98.
226. Id. § 21(1). Since the operative terms here are “believes” and “suspects,” it
puts the legal onus on the proof of the Secretary of State’s mental state rather than
on what the detainee has done.
227. Id. § 23.
228. Id. § 25.
229. Nonetheless, in a decision of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission
(SIAC) of July 30, 2002, the Commission found Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime
and Security Act of 2001 to be in breach of the Human Rights Act 1998, particularly
those provisions that brought into British law Article 5 and Article 14 of the
European Convention of Human Rights. SIAC reasoned:
We have decided that the Government was entitled to form the view that there
was and still is a public emergency threatening the life of the nation and that
the detention of those reasonably suspected to be international terrorists
involved with or with organisations linked to Al Qa’ida is strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation. However, there has been no derogation from Article
14 which prohibits discrimination in the application of the ECHR. The Act
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SIAC procedures, there is a limited ability for a detainee to
challenge the evidence that is presented against him, and because
of the sensitive nature of the information that may be presented,
the detainee may not necessarily be represented throughout the
process by counsel of his choosing, but must instead be
represented by someone appointed by SIAC with the relevant
security clearance. Both the detainee and his chosen counsel may
be excluded from all or part of any hearing on the detainee’s
230
case.
The issue that gave rise to this framework for indefinite
detention arose from facts that became clear in the case of
231
Chahal v. United Kingdom
before the European Court of
Human Rights. In Chahal, Britain had determined that Chahal
was a suspected terrorist and should be deported back to his
232
home country of India. However, Chahal, being a Sikh activist,
had already been beaten at the hands of Indian police, and he
233
faced the very real possibility of such treatment again.
As a
result, the European Court of Human Rights indicated Britain
would violate Article 3 of the Convention (on the prohibition of
torture as well as degrading and inhuman treatment) if it
permits the detention of non-British citizens alone and it is quite clear from the
evidence before us that there are British citizens who are likely to be as
dangerous as non-British citizens and who have been involved with Al Qa’ida or
organisations linked to it. It is not only discriminatory and so unlawful under
Article 14 to target non-British citizens but also it is disproportionate in that
there is no reasonable relationship between the means employed and the aims
sought to be pursued. On that ground, we have decided that the 2001 Act, which
is the measure derogating from the obligations under the Convention, to the
extent that it permits only the detention of foreign suspected international
terrorists is not compatible with the Convention.

Summary of SIAC judgment, available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/
2002/jul/SIAC.pdf.
This case was appealed by the government to the court of appeal which, in A and
others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002] EWCA Civ 1502, [2003]
1 All ER 816, 13 BHRC 394, determined that the government had good reason to
believe that emergency conditions prevailed, and therefore the UK’s derogation from
Article 5 was valid. The court of appeal further determined that distinctions
between citizens and aliens did not run afoul of the ECHR Article 14 prohibition on
discrimination. Id. So, while the British courts ultimately rejected SIAC’s challenge
to the law, it was astonishing that the court charged with review of the immigration
cases found parts of the 2001 law to be in violation of human rights standards.
230. See Helen Fenwick, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A
Proportionate Response to 11 September, 65 MOD. L. REV. 724, 740-41 (2002)
(providing details of the procedures under SIAC).
231. Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (1997).
232. Id. at 423.
233. Id. at 424.
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234

Britain, having determined that
deported Chahal to India.
235
Chahal was dangerous, did not want to release him either. The
British government decided to keep him in indefinite detention
even though Chahal had not been found guilty of violating any
law in Britain. One obvious solution, that Chahal be put on trial
in Britain, was rejected by the government, which cited both the
sensitivity of the evidence that would have to be presented and
236
the high standard of proof that would have to be met.
The
solution to this conundrum —where the British government was
unwilling to put a suspect on trial and unable to deport him to his
237
home country —was indefinite detention without trial.
Since the 2001 anti-terrorism law was passed, at least
fourteen people have been indefinitely detained under these
238
Most have been held for more than two years
provisions.
already in harsh conditions, confined to their cells for at least
239
twenty-two hours a day.
According to press reports, one has
had polio since childhood and is steadily getting worse, another
entered detention having already lost two limbs and a third has
attempted suicide. Several of the detainees were held because
they had been involved in fundraising to help the Chechen side of
the war in Chechnya; others are suspected of being members of
the GIA, an Algerian group linked to terrorist incidents in
240
France, Canada and the United States.
But their identities,
and the allegations against them, have never been made public in
any official way.
Another change in the 2001 anti-terrorism law that has
caused concern is Section 117. While the 2000 law was lauded for
dropping the obligation of bystanders to assist the police in their
inquiries, at the expense of being forced under penalty of law to
inform on friends and relatives, the 2001 anti-terrorism law
241
brought this measure back again.
Now those who merely keep
silent instead of volunteering active assistance to the police
234. Chahal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 436.
235. Id. at 425.
236. Fenwick, supra note 230, at 731.
237. Id.
238. Martin Bright, Revealed: Shocking Truth of Britain’s ‘Camp Delta,’ OBSERVER
(London),
Dec.
14,
2003,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/humanrights/
story/0,7369,1106666,00.html (last visited May 13, 2004).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, supra note 155, § 117.
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subject themselves to criminal liability if they are in possession of
any facts material to a terrorism inquiry.
With the start of 2004, the Blair government was floating a
series of proposals that would result in far more draconian
exercises of state power as part of its war against terrorism. The
government proposed to overhaul the Civil Contingencies Law,
which outlined the legal conditions for declaring and maintaining
242
a state of emergency in Britain. In this law, an emergency was
defined rather loosely as an “event or situation which threatens
serious damage to human welfare . . . the environment . . . or the
243
security of . . . a place in Britain.”
However, if an emergency
were to be declared, authorized measures would include
instituting public curfews, banning public meetings, and seizing
244
private property without compensation.
The government could
take control of major financial institutions, declare a bank
holiday, and allow ministers to amend any act of parliament in
245
order to deal with an emergency. The bill stirred up substantial
public concern and the government seemed inclined to back off
some of its more astonishing claims of power, agreeing, for
example, to say that any temporary legislation adopted without
parliamentary approval (another power authorized in the draft
bill) would have to be retrospectively approved by the parliament
246
within thirty days or it would sunset.
But the government has
247
not withdrawn the bill.
More recently, Home Secretary David Blunkett has made a
series of proposals that would affect the protections given
criminal defendants, particularly terrorism suspects. In addition
to proposing that the standard of proof be lowered in criminal
cases involving terrorism charges and that the government be
allowed to act “preemptively” against terrorism suspects,
Blunkett also suggested that courts accept evidence from

242. United Kingdom, A Draft of the Civil Contingencies Law, at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmbills/014/2004014.htm (last
visited May 13, 2004).
243. Id. § 1(1).
244. Id. § 21.
245. Id.
246. Matthew Tempest, Government Backs Down on Terror Bill, GUARDIAN
(London), Jan. 7, 2004, available at http://politics.guardian.co.uk/attacks/
story/0,1320,1117712,00.html.
247. Mike Merritt, Isles Could be Terror Attack Refugee Camps, MAIL ON SUNDAY
(London), June 6, 2004, at 25.
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electronic surveillance, something courts in Britain presently do
248
These proposals also prompted an outcry, but the
not do.
proposals are still under review.
As can be seen from this quick review of Britain’s recent
anti-terrorism laws, separate legal regimes of surveillance,
arrest, and detention have been instituted for those suspected of
terrorism offenses. While the laws speak of giving these new
powers to the police, it is clear from the history of British counterterrorism policy that the police have, in general, worked hand in
hand with MI5, exchanging information, personnel and
investigatory strategy. Given the relative powerlessness of
British courts to challenge statutes, it appears that the only
substantial check on these procedures will come from the
European Court of Human Rights.
IV. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE INSTITUTIONS
Within the Council of Europe, a political community
comprising forty-five countries, efforts to fight terrorism go back
several decades with the centerpiece being the European
249
Convention for the Prevention of Terrorism of 1977.
After
September 11, a new Protocol amending this treaty was opened
for signature, in order to “strengthen the fight against terrorism,
250
while respecting human rights.”
This Protocol updated the list
of terrorism offenses to include those incorporated since the time
of the original agreement in various conventions of the United
Nations and made the further amendment of this Convention
251
easier in order to take new developments into account.
Perhaps more importantly, given the Council of Europe’s
primary mandate to ensure human rights protection, the
Committee of Ministers adopted Guidelines on Human Rights
252
and the Fight against Terrorism.
While recognizing that
248. Alan Travis & Richard Norton-Taylor, Blunkett Wants Big Expansion of MI5
and New Security Laws to Counter Terror Threat, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 23, 2004,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/ 0,12780,1153808,00.html.
249. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, T.S. No.
90, 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/
EN/Treaties/Html/090.htm.
250. Protocol Amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism,
Treaty Open for Signature by Member States Signatories to Treaty ETS 90 on May
15, 2003, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/190.htm.
251. Id. art. 1-2.
252. Council of Europe, Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight Against
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terrorist attacks are themselves violations of the human rights of
affected populations and that states not only have the right, but
also the obligation, to protect their populations against these
attacks, the guidelines set out ground rules that states must
follow in fighting terrorism. It is these ground rules that ensure
respect for human rights in the fight itself. In particular, the
guidelines require that all states’ measures to fight terrorism be
free of arbitrariness and discrimination, and that the measures
253
In addition, all
be “subject to appropriate supervision.”
measures that the states take to combat terrorism must
themselves be lawful, and when any measure restricts human
rights, those restrictions must “be defined as precisely as possible
254
The
and be necessary and proportionate to the aim pursued.”
guidelines also establish an absolute prohibition on torture, from
which derogation is not possible, as well as clear rules about the
255
collection of personal data.
There are minimum standards for
256
The guidelines
arrests, requiring “reasonable suspicion.”
require judicial supervision of the processes of arrest and
257
detention and permit no detentions without judicial review.
They set fixed limits for police custody and require guarantees of
independence and impartiality of the judges in any legal
258
proceeding. The guidelines maintain that there should be right
to counsel (with some restrictions on free communication with
259
counsel in the interests of security). They also urge cooperation
of countries in extradition proceedings (except where the suspect
may face the death penalty, torture or persecution for
260
discriminatory reasons in the receiving country).
And they
261
Broadly
recommend compensation for victims of terrorism.
speaking, the guidelines follow the same general principles
enunciated by the European Court of Human Rights in their long
line of terrorism cases.
Terrorism, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on July
11, 2002, available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_rights/h-inf(2002)8eng.pdf.
253. Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism, supra note
252, art. II.
254. Id. art. III.
255. Id.
256. Id. art. VII.
257. Id. arts. VII, VIII.
258. Id. art. IX.
259. Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism, supra note
252, art. IX.
260. Id. art. XIII.
261. Id. art. XVII.
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Neither Germany nor Britain’s anti-terrorism responses can
be understood in full without reference to the European
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) that binds both
262
countries in a common commitment to protect human rights.
When domestic mechanisms fail to keep a country’s practices in
accord with the ECHR, individuals whose rights have been
violated may appeal against the state to the ECtHR in
Strasbourg. Given our brief surveys of the anti-terrorism policies
of Germany and the UK, it will not be surprising to discover that
the ECtHR has had a far greater direct impact on the UK than on
Germany, if only for the simple reason that the UK’s domestic
institutions, including the courts, do not yet reliably produce
results in compliance with the court’s view of the ECHR.
Germany, on the other hand, is rarely reprimanded with a
negative judgment in this area.
Cases take a long time to reach final decision at the
263
ECtHR, so there are no cases arising on post-September-11
262. The European Court of Human Rights is a creature of the Council of Europe,
not the European Union. Council of Europe, The European Court of Human Rights:
Historical
Background,
Organisation
and
Procedure,
at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDocs/HistoricalBackground.htm (last visited May 14,
2004). In practice, however, all of the member states (and all of the accession states)
of the European Union are also member states in the Council of Europe. The Council
of Europe, however, encompasses not only the twenty-five member states of the
European Union, but also includes twenty additional states, most in Eastern Europe.
Council
of
Europe,
About
the
Council
of
Europe,
at
http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about_coe (last visited May 14, 2004). In addition to the
forty-five member states, there are also five states or entities with observer status:
the United States, Canada, Japan, Mexico and the Holy See. Id. Membership in the
Council of Europe requires a country to enter the European Convention on Human
Rights. Id. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 197. The
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights is technically binding only on
the parties to the specific cases, but it is advisable for other countries whose practices
may raise similar issues to adjust their laws and practices to comply with the norms
that may one day be applied in a concrete case to them.
263. In most countries, petitioners have to have exhausted all domestic remedies
before lodging a valid appeal at the ECHR. The court then issues an admissibility
decision, which is akin to a certiorari decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, except that
such admissibility decisions generally come with opinions of their own. The case, if
admitted, will then be slated for a hearing, which can take time because of the court’s
heavy workload. As a result, the process typically takes from five to seven years
from the time a case is filed to the time it reaches final disposition. Cases now being
decided by the court typically refer to facts that arose nearly a decade ago. See
generally Paul Mahoney, New Challenges for the European Court of Human Rights
Resulting from the Expanding Case Load and Membership, 21 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV.
101 (2002) (discussing the burden the expanding caseload places on the fulfillment of
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facts that have generated judgments yet. Nonetheless, terrorism
and its attempted control are nothing new in the states under the
jurisdiction of the court, so there have been a number of
terrorism-related issues that have been decided since September
11 on facts that arose years ago. None show a major change in
the court’s firm commitment to the preservation of human rights
of potential suspects, even after that watershed date.
The ECtHR’s jurisprudence on terrorism, outlining the
legitimate methods for fighting terrorist threats, covers a wide
variety of areas. Through a series of cases arising out of the
Turkish Security Courts, where terrorism-related trials are
conducted, the court has held that special tribunals on which
military judges may sit are inappropriate for trying civilian
defendants because military judges are not impartial as between
264
an individual and the state.
The European Convention in
Article 6(1) requires that hearings be conducted by an
265
“independent and impartial tribunal established by law,” and in
the view of the court, military tribunals or civilian tribunals with
266
military judges, violate the requirement of impartiality.
The
court has retained this view, even after September 11. In a highprofile case involving Turkey’s most well-known terrorist,
Abdullah Ocalan, the court still insisted that Turkey’s system of
military tribunals did not provide adequate guarantees of judicial
267
independence.
The court has developed a substantial jurisprudence on the
acceptable length of detention, interpreting the provision of
European Convention Article 5(3) that everyone arrested or
268
Britain’s
detained “shall be brought promptly before a judge.”
regime of extended detention in terrorism cases in Northern

the court’s mission).
264. See, e.g., Sener v. Turkey, App. No. 26680/95, [2000] ECHR 26680/95, July 18,
2000.
265. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 197, art. 6(1).
266. The court concluded:
certain aspects of these judges’ status made their independence and impartiality
questionable . . . for example, the fact that they are servicemen who still belong
to the army, which in turn takes its orders from the Executive; the fact that they
remain subject to military discipline; and the fact that decisions pertaining to
their appointment are to a great extent taken by the administrative authorities
and the army . . . .

Sener, [2000] ECHR 26680/95.
267. Ocalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, [2003] ECHR 46221/99, Mar. 12, 2003.
268. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 197, art. 5(3).
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Ireland was found to be inconsistent with the Article 5(3) in
269
In that case, various detainees
Brogan v. United Kingdom.
were held under anti-terrorism laws for periods ranging from four
to six days and were released without ever having been charged
270
or brought before a judge to have their detentions reviewed.
Without defining a bright-line number of hours or days, the court
held that detention periods of this length without judicial review
271
were too long.
There is, however, a bright line with respect to
unacknowledged detention, which is, in the view of the court, a
272
“grave violation” of Article 5.
In Orhan v. Turkey, relatives of
the petitioner had been taken away by the security forces in
Turkey, never to be seen again. One of the many violations the
court found on these facts was the lack of acknowledgement that
273
those taken were in detention at all.
The ECtHR also has weighed in on the acceptability of
pretrial detention in a case from France, in which the petitioner
had been held for trial for five years and seven months before
274
finally being acquitted. According to the court, this delay was a
breach of both Article 5(3) under which a defendant is “entitled to
275
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial” and
Article 6(1) under which a defendant is entitled to a fair and
276
public hearing “within a reasonable time.”
The specific treatment of those in state detention has also
been the subject of a number of ECtHR rulings. In a case
growing out of the “troubles” in Northern Ireland, the court found
that Britain’s treatment of detainees, who had been held under
the early terrorism laws, violated Article 3 of the Convention
because the detainees had been subjected to inhuman and
277
degrading treatment. The detainees were subjected to hooding,
sleep deprivation, food deprivation, “wall standing” (being made

269. Brogan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 11209/84, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 117 (1988).
270. Id. at 120-22.
271. Id. at 135-36.
272. Orhan v. Turkey, App. No. 25656/94 [2002] ECHR 25656/94, June 18, 2002. It
might also be noted that this was a case decided after September 11 and after
widespread publicity surrounding the American detention of “enemy combatants” at
Guantánamo.
273. Id.
274. Tomasi v. France, App. No. 12850/87, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1993).
275. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 197, art. 5(3).
276. Id. art. 6(1); Tomasi, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 36, 39.
277. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1980).
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to stand in a position that induced pain when held over a long
period of time) and sustained exposure to stressful noises before
278
and during their interrogations. This treatment was held to fall
279
short of torture, but was aimed at causing disorientation and
sensory deprivation to weaken the resolve of the detainees during
interrogation. As a result, the use of these techniques violated
Article 3 because they constituted degrading and inhuman
treatment.
Techniques causing sustained pain can give rise to a finding
280
that a state has engaged in torture under Article 3. Turkey has
been found in violation of Article 3 in a case involving a man
suspected of being a member of the PKK, the Kurdish separatist
281
group that had committed a number of terrorist acts in Turkey.
The court found that the man had suffered loss of the use of his
hands and nerve damage in both arms as a result of being hung
for extended periods of time and exposed to electric shocks,
282
treatment which amounted to torture.
No criminal case was
ever brought against him, nor were investigations conducted into
his allegations of torture at the hands of the state. The court held
that “the treatment was of such a serious and cruel nature that it
283
could only be described as torture” and a breach of Article 3.
Because the petitioner had been held for fourteen days without
being brought before a judge, Turkey was also found in breach of
284
Article 5(3), though it had explicitly derogated from this article.
Another Turkish case involved a human rights worker who had
285
been suspected of involvement with the PKK.
The petitioner
claimed that while she had been detained by the police, she had
been tortured by being hung naked and subjected to electric
286
shocks, threatened with rape and even death.
Although the
court in this case could not resolve the factual issue concerning
278. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 81-85.
279. Id. at 80.
280. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 197, art. 3.
281. Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 21987/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553 (1997).
282. Id. at 560-61.
283. Id. at 585.
284. Id. at 590. Turkey derogated under Article 15 of the Convention, which allows
a country in time of war to take measures contrary to the Convention to the “extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation . . . .” Id. at 586 (quoting European
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 197, art. 15). But the Convention does not
permit derogation from Article 3. Id. at Art. 15(2).
285. Veznedaroglu v. Turkey, App. No. 32357/96, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 59 (2001).
286. Id. at 63.
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whether or not the treatment she had alleged had occurred, the
court found that the state nonetheless had obligations under
Article 3 to investigate the allegations, which the state had not
287
Consequently, Turkey was found to be in breach of the
done.
288
Convention.
According to the ECtHR jurisprudence, the right to counsel
applies even in terrorism cases. In two British cases, Averill v.
289
290
United Kingdom and Murray v. United Kingdom, it was
determined that Britain was in violation of Article 6, which
guarantees the right to defend oneself through legal assistance.
The facts of the cases arose out of the same basic circumstances
under similar legal regimes. Petitioners were detained under the
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 for
crimes committed growing out of the situation in Northern
Ireland, and in both cases, they were told that adverse inferences
291
could be drawn if they remained silent.
Both petitioners asked
for legal counsel, which was refused in both cases under
292
Murray was interrogated for
provisions of the terrorism laws.
twenty-one hours without counsel and refused to answer
293
questions.
He was denied access to a lawyer for forty-eight
hours. His refusal to answer questions was then introduced as
evidence against him at trial and the judge was permitted to
294
draw an adverse inference from his silence. Averill was sent for
forensic examination during which hairs were taken from his
295
head and fibers were recovered from his clothes.
He refused to
answer questions either about the actions for which he was
arrested or about the hairs and fibers that were later used as
296
evidence.
His request for a lawyer went unfulfilled for more
297
Later, his silence was presented
than twenty-four hours.
298
against him at trial and an adverse inference requested.
He

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Veznedaroglu, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 67.
Id.
Averill v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36408/97, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 (2000).
Murray v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18731/91, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29 (1996).
Id. at 46; Averill, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 40.
Murray, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 32; Averill, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 41.
Murray, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 32.
Id. at 33.
Averill, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 40.
Id.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 44.
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299

was convicted. In both cases before the ECtHR, the court found
300
Precisely because the terrorism law
a violation of Article 6.
allowed adverse inferences from silence, the court explained that
petitioner had an especially urgent right to have access to counsel
from the beginning of an interrogation.
Perhaps the densest jurisprudence in the area of criminal
procedure relates to the permissible conditions for electronic
surveillance under Article 8 of the Convention, which provides a
right to respect for private and family life, home, and
301
correspondence.
This article includes a second section that
allows interference with the right “in accordance with the law”
but only where “necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of a
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedom
302
of others.”
Nonetheless, something still remains of the privacy
protections identified in the first section of Article 8.
303

The Klass case, arising out of the German law on electronic
surveillance, was heard by the Federal Constitutional Court in
Germany. The case involved a challenge to the law passed
subsequent to the constitutional amendment of Article 10, which
concerned privacy of communications and allowed electronic
surveillance in the absence of judicial review as long as some sort
304
of parliamentary review was available.
Despite vigorous
dissents, the Federal Constitutional Court upheld most of the
law, ruling that the G-10 committees described above were
sufficient guarantors of legality in the administration of the
305
surveillance procedures.
Finding the part of the statute that
barred notification to be unconstitutional, the Federal
Constitutional Court held that the target of the surveillance had
306
to be notified once the surveillance was over.
The petitioners

299. Averill, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 40.
300. Id. at 54; Murray, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 40-41.
301. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 197, art. 8.
302. Id.
303. The Klass Case, Judgment of 15 December 1970, BVerfGE 30, 1. See also
discussion of this case supra notes 69-74.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. “By judgment of 15 December 1970, that Court held that Article 1(5), subparagraph 5 of the G 10 was void, being incompatible with the second sentence of
Article 10(2) of the Basic Law, in so far as it excluded notification of the person
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went to the European Court of Human Rights, which agreed with
307
the Federal Constitutional Court. The ECtHR found that some
surveillance was indeed necessary to preserve national security
and to protect against crime, but
The Court, being aware of the danger such a law poses of
undermining and even destroying democracy on the ground
of defending it, affirms that Contracting States may not, in
the name of the struggle against espionage and terrorism,
adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate. The Court
must be satisfied that, whatever system of surveillance is
adopted, there exist adequate and effective guarantees
308
against abuse.

While the ECtHR noted that judicial review is usually preferred,
it found that the German alternative had sufficient protections,
including individualized review, that enabled it to pass muster
under the European Convention.
The ECtHR elaborated its views about the legality of
surveillance under the European Convention in a series of later
309
cases, of which Huvig v. France presents the best overview of
the court’s requirements. The court found that telephone tapping
was a violation of Article 8, which might nonetheless be justified
if it were “necessary in a democratic society” and “in accordance
310
with law.”
Even though France had no statutory basis for
telephone tapping, it had case law that could amount to a legal
311
basis for such practices. Nonetheless, the application of the law
would not be foreseeable since actual wiretaps were done in
secret and no one could know whether their actions put them at
312
risk of being tapped.
According to the court, the case law was
uncertain and allowed too much discretion to each judge who was
permitted to issue wiretap warrants, and citizens had to have an
adequate indication of the circumstances in which such practices
313
could be permitted.
In particular, the law had to specify the
concerned about the measures of surveillance even when such notification could be
given without jeopardising the purpose of the restriction.” Klass v. Germany, App.
No. 5029/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214 (1979).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 232.
309. Huvig v. France, App. No. 11105/84, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 528 (1990).
310. Id. at 540.
311. Id. at 541.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 544-45.
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offenses for which warrants could be issued, the permissible
duration of the surveillance and the limits on what could be done
314
with the results of such wiretaps. Having a particularly precise
law that contained safeguards for the personal privacy of citizens
was a necessity under the European Convention.
Since September 11, the European Court of Human Rights
has issued a number of decisions that provide reason to believe
that the court will not allow its jurisprudence to bend in the face
of the terrorist attacks. In fact, in a case issued just two weeks
after September 11, the court found that a listening device
installed in a prison cell violated Article 8 of the Convention, and
the court repeated its criteria for legitimate electronic
315
surveillance without flinching in light of recent events.
September 11 seems to have had no discernible impact on
the jurisprudence of the court, which has insisted in previous
terrorism cases that terrorism offenses provided no special
grounds for deviation from the Convention’s requirements.
Despite the large number of legal changes that are taking place
in response to September 11, it is clear that the European Court
of Human Rights believes fighting terrorism need not be done by
changing the standards of protection for human rights.
V. CONCLUSIONS
After September 11, international pressures emanating from
the UN Security Council have required all states to take steps to
fight terrorism. Within the European Union, actions of various
EU bodies have also encouraged member states to modify their
domestic laws in response to September 11. But the examination
of what Britain and Germany have done in the wake of
September 11 reveal that transnational pressures explain very
little of the specific responses of these two states. While both
Britain and Germany enacted major anti-terrorism laws after
September 11, the specifics of those laws were very different,
even as both faced identical international mandates.
In
particular, Britain continued its own past practices of treating
terrorism offenses in an exceptional manner with methods that
have in the past been held to violate the standards of the
European Convention on Human Rights and will probably be held
314. Huvig, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 544-45.
315. P.G. & J.H. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 00044787/98, [2001] ECHR 44787/98
(Sept. 25, 2001).
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in the future to do so as well. Germany, by contrast, maintained
careful constitutional protections even while responding to the
demands of transnational institutions to revise its laws.
Germany, too, continued along the lines it had previously
followed in its own constitutional development, being particularly
cautious in the context of its post-war constitution to maintain
clear checks on potentially abusive powers.
The reactions of transnational institutions to September 11
varied as well. While the Security Council and the EU took steps
to toughen anti-terrorism efforts, the Council of Europe
institutions in general, and the European Court of Human Rights
in particular, reinforced their commitment to upholding high
human rights standards. Understanding the difference in the
responses of international institutions also requires that we
examine what each of these institutions was doing before
September 11. The Security Council’s mandate involved dealing
with threats to international peace and security, so terrorism
appeared first and foremost as a threat of the sort that resultsdriven hard-edged measures could be used to address. The
Security Council had little experience in considering human
rights, and September 11 did not make the Security Council move
into a direction that it had previously never gone. Similarly with
the European Union. EU institutions had been presiding over
ever-increasing cooperation among European member states
without having their own rights charter or specialist bodies
charged with defending rights as their primary task. Not
surprisingly, the EU responded by doing more of what it had done
before–creating
more common institutions and procedures,
increasing cooperation across a wider range of topics, and trying
to define more of their joint legal space as common legal space.
Finally, the European Court of Human Rights, with the primary
responsibility for upholding human rights norms given in the
European Convention, seemed to see September 11 as something
that required no changes in its own doctrine.
It is often said that September 11 “changed everything.” But
from what we have seen in our survey of a number of major legal
shift akin to the USA PATRIOT Act in the United States,
September 11 may have changed specific legal responses to
terrorism, but it did not fundamentally change the legal
character of those institutions and states that reacted to the
terrorist attacks.
Instead of making everything different,
September 11 made the institutions and states whose reactions
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